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COMMENTS
Charting a Course between Scylla and Charybdis: Child
Abuse Registries and Procedural Due Process
By the other way there are two crags, one reaching up to the
broad heavens with its sharp peak.... Here Scylla dwells and
utters hideous cries; her voice like that of a young dog, and she
herself an evil monster. None can behold her and be glad, be it a
god who meets her. Twelve feet she has, and all misshapen; six
necks, exceeding long; on each a frightful head; in these three rows
of teeth, stout and close-set, fraught with dark death.... Never
could sailors boast of passing her in safety; for with each head she
takes a man, snatching him from the dark-bowed ship.
The second crag is lower, you will see, Odysseus, and close
beside the first .... On it a fig tree stands, tall and in leafy
bloom, underneath which divine Charybdis sucks the water down.
For thrice a day she sends it up, and thrice she sucks it down,-a
fearful sight! May you not happen to be there when it goes down,
for nobody could save you then from ill .... But swiftly turn
your course toward Scylla's crag and speed the ship along; for
surely it is better to miss six comrades from your ship than all
together'
To those who are responsible for making and carrying out
policies designed to protect children from harm inflicted by their own
families, the plight of Homer's ancient sailors will appear familiar
indeed.2 When the issue is child abuse or neglect, there is a constant
tension between the need to identify and rescue children who are in
danger in their own homes, and the need to respect and protect
family privacy and autonomy. Compelling interests are at stake on
1. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 182-83 (George Herbert Palmer trans., Riverside Press
1921) (1884)).
2. In fact, the image of Scylla and Charybdis has been invoked by one federal court
of appeals faced with weighing the privacy rights of parents against the state's interest in
protecting children from harm. See Hodge v. Jones, 31 F.3d 157, 164 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 581 (1994); see also infra text accompanying note 314 (quoting the
Fourth Circuit's classical allusion).
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both sides, and too often it seems that one goal must be sacrificed to
the other.'
The problem of child abuse in the United States is an old one,4
but the search for solutions in public policies and government
programs is relatively new.' Forty years ago, most states had no
comprehensive child abuse laws or child protection programs. Today,
every state has a complex statutory scheme establishing child
protective services agencies and enabling them to receive reports of
child abuse and neglect, to investigate homes and families, to petition
courts to adjudge a child abused or neglected, and to take actions to
protect children that can include the removal of children from their
homes and the termination of parental rights.
6
The growth in state response to child maltreatment has occurred
concurrently with-and in many respects, as the result of-an
enormous increase in public awareness of child abuse and neglect. By
1982, polling agencies had documented that Americans believed that
child abuse was a major and growing social problem in the United
States, warranting strong governmental action.' This growth in public
awareness of child abuse, and in the policies and programs designed
to address it, coincided with the information and technology revolu-
tion of recent decades. Computer technology has permitted child
protective services agencies to gather and maintain, in an easily
accessible manner, large amounts of information on families that
receive child protective services. Many states now maintain child
maltreatment central registries--databases of child abuse and neglect
cases that typically identify the abuser, as well as the child who was
harmed.9
3. See Douglas J. Besharov, "Doing Something" About Child Abuse, 8 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 539,554 (1985) [hereinafter Besharov, "Doing Something"] ("Government
action is often the only way to protect children from death and serious injury.... But in
seeking to protect helpless children, it is all too easy to ignore the legitimate rights of
parents.").
4. See infra notes 20-33 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 44-85 and accompanying text.
7. Besharov, "Doing Something," supra note 3, at 539 (citing National Committee for
Prevention of Child Abuse, A Survey of Public Perceptions of Child Abuse: The State of
the Economy, Risk of Involvement in Juvenile and Adult Crime, and What the Individual
Can Do To Prevent Abuse (Working Paper 003, 1982)).
8. This Comment uses the term "child maltreatment" to encompass all types of child
abuse-physical, sexual, and emotional-and child neglect. The term "central registry"
refers to any centralized database or listing of child maltreatment reports or records that
the state child protective services agency maintains pursuant to a state statute.
9. See infra notes 86-110 and accompanying text.
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In a climate of growing concern about child abuse, it is not
surprising that many state legislatures quickly recognized that central-
ized databases of child abusers could serve as a tool to prevent known
or suspected abusers from obtaining employment in occupations
requiring unsupervised contact with children, serving as foster or
adoptive parents, or otherwise obtaining unsupervised access to a
child. Thus, some states have authorized certain categories of persons
and organizations, such as child day care center employers and
adoption agencies, to use the information on the state's child
maltreatment central registries.10 When this access is available,
inclusion in the registry can impede an individual's employment and
other opportunities, and can therefore amount to a governmentally
imposed deprivation of liberty and property interests. When this
occurs, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause is
implicated."
This Comment discusses the tension that is created when the
need to retain information for the purpose of adequately protecting
children conflicts with alleged maltreaters' liberty and property
interests in family privacy, family integrity, and employment. The
Comment begins by describing briefly the problem of child maltreat-
ment and the early movement toward state intervention in the parent-
child relationship.'2 The Comment then describes state statutory
schemes for child protective services 3 and the place of the child
maltreatment central registry in a comprehensive statutory scheme.'4
Next, it describes the content and purposes of child maltreatment
central registries. 5 The Comment then summarizes the law of
procedural due process in the United States. This summary describes
the liberty and property interests that the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause protects, 6 and explains how courts determine
whether the procedures accorded individuals deprived of a protected
interest are constitutionally sufficient.' The Comment identifies the
due process issues that arise when child maltreatment registries are
10. See infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
11. The Due Process Clause states that no state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. See infra notes 20-43 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 44-85 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 98-110 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 111-49 and accompanying text; notes 183-92 and accompanying text;
notes 219-32 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 239-50 and accompanying text.
1995] 2065
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
maintained, and explains how some courts have dealt with these
problems."' The Comment concludes with recommendations for
child maltreatment registry statutes that would protect the due process
rights of the persons named on the registries, while ensuring that child
protective services agencies retain access to the information they need
to protect children adequately. 9
I. CHILD MALTREATMENT AND CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES
PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Problem of Child Abuse and Neglect in the United States
Although child abuse has no doubt been occurring for as long as
human beings have been reproducing,' the idea that it is ap-
propriate for government to seek to protect children from their own
parents is of relatively recent origin.2" The early common law of
England considered children to be the property of their fathers,'
and paternal autonomy was very nearly absolute.' Thus, in the
early days of American history, harsh treatment of children by their
parents was beyond the reach of the law.'
The best-known early instance of court intervention into a case
of child abuse in the United States occurred in New York in 1874,
and involved Mary Ellen Wilson, a young orphan who lived with
18. See infra notes 150-82 and accompanying text; notes 193-218 and accompanying
text; notes 233-38 and accompanying text; notes 283-313 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 348-57 and accompanying text.
20. See Mason P. Thomas, Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect Part I: Historical Overview,
Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REV. 293, 293-99 (1972) (describing child
maltreatment in ancient civilizations and the documentation of this maltreatment in
sources ranging from the Bible to fairy tales).
21. See generally Besharov, "Doing Something," supra note 3, at 540-50 (describing the
history of state intervention into families to protect abused children).
22. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *452-53.
23. See Thomas, supra note 20, at 299. The ancient law of Rome granted fathers
complete power over their children: a father "could kill, mutilate, sell, or offer his child
in sacrifice." Id. at 295. These values were reflected in the early common law of England,
where a father's custody of his children was very nearly absolute, regardless of the
conditions of the child's life or the child's well-being. Id. at 299. The mother's right to the
child was subordinated to the father's. Id.
24. Id. at 300. The English common law that was brought to this country by the
colonists permitted "the father [to] rule[] over both his wife and children. Parental
discipline of children was both severe and arbitrary.... The courts rarely interfered ...
Id.
25. Mary Ellen's case is the subject of one of the child welfare field's most well-loved
and oft-repeated legends. Id. at 308. According to the legend, Mary Ellen, an eight-year-
old orphan, was rescued from her abusive foster family by the American Society for the
[Vol. 732066
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a family that ostracized her and beat her regularly.' Mary Ellen
testified to her situation as follows:
My mother and father are both dead.... I don't know how
old I am. I have no recollection of a time when I did not
live with the Connollys.... I am never allowed to play with
any children, or have any company whatsoever. [Mrs.
Connolly] is in the habit of whipping and beating me almost
every day.... I have no recollection of ever having been
kissed by anyone .... 27
The evidence showed that Mary Ellen was indeed the victim of
shocking abuse and neglect. She had been beaten to the point of
being black and blue.' She was routinely locked in a bedroom and
prohibited from playing with other children, and she was forced to
sleep on the floor.29 Mrs. Connolly ultimately was found guilty of
assault and battery and was sentenced to one year of hard labor for
her treatment of Mary Ellen.30
Public outrage over Mary Ellen's case prompted the organization
of the New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children in
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA), there being no similar organization to offer
assistance to children. The ASPCA's attorney succeeded in persuading the court that
children are members of the animal kingdom and are therefore entitled to the same legal
protections from cruelty as animals. Thus, the child protective services movement in the
United States was born. For a recent recital of this legend, see NATIONAL COMMITTEE
FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, INJURY PREVENTION: MEETING THE
CHALLENGE 213 (1989) [hereinafter INJURY CONTROL]. Additional sources of the legend
are noted in Thomas, supra note 20, at 308 n.58. While Mary Ellen's case was indeed
initiated by the founder of the ASPCA, he undertook the case upon his own initiative, and
acted in his individual capacity. Id at 308.
26. Thomas, supra note 20, at 309. In an even earlier case, a state court recognized
that a state may intrude on the rights of parents when the child's well-being is at stake.
In Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1839), a young girl had been committed to the
Philadelphia House of Refuge by her mother, who claimed the child was incorrigible. Id.
at 9-10. The child's father argued that the state statute authorizing the commitment and
detention of a child without a trial by jury was unconstitutional. Id at 11. In upholding
the commitment, the court stated:
It is to be remembered that the public has a paramount interest in the virtue and
knowledge of its members, and that of strict right, the business of education
belongs to it. That parents are ordinarily [e]ntrusted with it is because it can
seldom be put into better hands; but where they are incompetent or corrupt,
what is there to prevent the public from withdrawing their faculties, held, as they
obviously are, at its sufferance? The right of parental control is a natural, but not
an inalienable one.
27. INJURY CONTROL, supra note 25, at 213 (quoting N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1874).
28. Thomas, supra note 20, at 309-10.
29. Id. at 310.
30. Id
20671995]
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18741 In 1875, the State of New York enacted legislation "that
authorized cruelty societies to fie complaints for the violation of any
laws affecting children and required law enforcement and court
officials to aid agents of the societies in the enforcement of these
laws" 32 --thus creating the first statutory child protective services
system in the United States.33
Despite these early efforts, widespread state action directed at
solving the problem of child abuse did not get underway until almost
a century later. In 1962, Dr. Henry Kempe coined the term "the
battered child syndrome" in an article in the Journal of the American
Medical Association,' and the nation's recognition of and response
to child abuse began to change dramatically. By the end of that
decade, every state had enacted child abuse reporting laws, which
sought to identify the victims of child abuse by requiring certain
professionals-such as pediatricians and school teachers-to report
suspected child abuse to child protective services agencies.35 Early
child abuse reporting laws usually were limited to physical child
abuse-that is, child battery-and did not attempt to address sexual
abuse or child neglect.36 In 1974, the United States Congress
enacted the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 7 which
provided funding for states to establish programs to identify and
provide protective services to children who were the subjects of any
type of maltreatment, including child neglect.38
Today, every state has a procedure for receiving reports of child
abuse and neglect, investigating those reports, and determining
31. Id.
32. Id. (citing An act for the incorporation of societies for the prevention of cruelty
to children, ch. 130, N.Y. Laws 65 (1875), excerpts reprinted in 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH
IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 1600-1865, at 192 (Robert H. Bremner ed.,
1971)).
33. INJURY CONTROL, supra note 25, at 213.
34. C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered Child Syndrome, 181 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 17,
17 (1962).
35. Margaret H. Meriwether, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: Time for a Change, 20
FAM. L.Q. 141, 142 (1986). The laws tended to be quite narrow in scope, requiring reports
to be made only when children had sustained physical injuries requiring medical attention,
and often granting considerable discretion to professionals to decide whether to report.
IL; see, e.g., Act of May 24, 1963, ch. 576, 1963 Cal. Stat. 1453 (directing physicians and
surgeons to report children who may have been physically abused, unless-in the doctor's
discretion making a report would be inconsistent "with the health, care or treatment" of
the child) (current version at CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (West Supp. 1994)).
36. Meriwether, supra note 35, at 142.
37. Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-
5106 (1988)).
38. 88 Stat. 5 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5106 (1988)).
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whether child protective services should be provided.39 The number
of reports of child maltreatment received by the state agencies that
provide these services is staggering. One source estimates that in
1992 almost three million children were reported to state child
protective services agencies,4 a fifty percent increase in the number
of reported children since 1985.4" An estimated 1.16 million of these
reports were substantiated,42 representing a ten percent increase in
39. See John E.B. Myers, A Survey of Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Statutes, 10
J. Juv. L. 1, 11-27 (1986) (summarizing the child abuse and neglect reporting statutes of
every state); see also infra notes 44-85 and accompanying text (describing typical state
procedures).
40. Karen McCurdy & Deborah Daro, Child Maltreatment: A National Survey of
Reports and Fatalities, 9 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 75, 81 (1994). The figure provided
is necessarily an estimate because widely varying state child maltreatment reporting
procedures make it impossible for researchers to obtain a direct count of the number of
maltreated children. Id. at 76. For example, some states keep records of reports that
reflect the number of families involved or of the incidents of maltreatment, rather than the
number of children harmed. Id. The three million figure cited is an estimate of the
number of children affected by maltreatment-not merely the number of incidents-and
it was computed as follows:
[W]e calculate the percentage change in reported children for those states
providing these numbers. For the remaining states, we calculate the percentage
change in reports under the assumption that a similar change would have
occurred in the number of children reported for maltreatment. We then compute
the mean change of all states with reporting data. Finally, we take the last
unduplicated count of reported children conducted in 1986 by the American
Association for Protecting Children as the baseline and multiply this number
(2,086,000) by the mean percentage change in reports between 1986 and 1992.
Id. at 77 (citation omitted).
41. Id. at 77.
42. Id. at 83. "Substantiated" means the child protective services agency subsequently
determined that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the treatment of the child
amounted to abuse or neglect, according to the state's statutory definitions of these terms.
See infra note 77 and accompanying text (defining "substantiated" and other terms used
by child protective services agencies); note 76 and accompanying text (describing the
standard of proof that must be reached in Maryland and New York before a report of
child abuse may be classified "substantiated").
The figures cited in this Comment reflect a substantiation rate of about 40%: Only
about 4 of every 10 reports of child maltreatment are ultimately determined to meet
statutory standards for affirmatively determining that abuse or neglect has occurred.
McCurdy & Daro, supra note 40, at 83. Authorities are divided on how this statistic
should be interpreted. Compare Douglas J. Besharov, Overreporting and Underreporting
are Twin Problems, in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE (Richard J.
Gelles & Donileen R. Loseke eds., 1993) 257,260-61 [hereinafter Besharov, Overreporting]
(arguing that the low rate of substantiation reflects overreporting of child maltreatment,
which results from overly broad child abuse reporting statutes) with David Finkelhor, The
Main Problem is Still Underreporting, Not Overreporting, in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES
ON FAMILY VIOLENCE (Richard J. Gelles & Donileen R. Loseke eds., 1993) 273, 279
(contending that many reports are classified "unsubstantiated" despite evidence that the
child has in fact been harmed). See also Eugene M. Lewit, Reported Child Abuse and
1995] 2069
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just one year in the number of children whose maltreatment was
substantiated.4 3 States have responded to this pervasive and growing
social problem by developing child protective services sys-
tems-policies and programs designed to identify and protect children
who have been, or may become, the victims of abuse or neglect.
B. State Child Protective Services Systems
The typical state child protective services (CPS) system has two
key features: a statutory scheme that specifies how the protection of
maltreated children is to be accomplished within the state; and an
administrative agency-the CPS agency--charged with carrying out
the purposes of the statutes." In most states, the CPS agency
consists of a central office, located within the state agency that
administers social services, and branch offices that provide local
services in municipalities or counties.45 The bulk of the investigatory
and protective services work is carried out by the local agencies.46
The statutory schemes that determine how child protective
services are administered vary greatly from state to state.47 Howev-
Neglect, 4 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 233, 236 (1994) ("[Flailure to substantiate a report of
child abuse and/or neglect does not indicate that maltreatment did not occur; instead,....
fit] may reflect the resources available to CPS [child protective services] agencies for
investigating reports, the priorities agencies establish for pursuing competing reports, or
the evidentiary circumstances of individual cases."); infra notes 57-65 and accompanying
text (describing statutory definitions of "abuse" and "neglect"); notes 66-69 and
accompanying text (describing the "caretaker" limitation on child protective services
agencies' authority to intervene in child maltreatment situations).
43. McCurdy & Daro, supra note 40, at 83.
44. A comprehensive review of the child protective services statutory schemes of every
state is beyond the scope of this Comment. The statutes of Maryland, New York, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia are used to exemplify the different
aspects of child protective services statutory schemes. For a review of child abuse and
neglect reporting statutes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, see Myers, supra
note 39.
45. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 423 (McKinney 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-542
(Supp. 1994); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6361 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-640 & 20-
7-650 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.6 (Michie Supp. 1994). States
differ in the amount of autonomy they allow local agencies to retain in managing their
CPS programs. See Patterns of Coping: States and Counties, in Special Issue, Social
Services for Children, Youth and Families in the United States, 12 CHILDREN & YOUTH
SERVICES REV. 39, 39-40 (1990). In all cases, however, the local agencies must carry out
activities that are mandated by state statutes, so there is uniformity throughout the state
in most significant policies and procedures.
46. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 423 (McKinney 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-542
(Supp. 1994); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6362 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-650(I)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.6 (Michie Supp. 1994).
47. See infra notes 48-85 and accompanying text.
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er, these schemes share some common elements. Every state has
procedures for accepting reports of child maltreatment, investigating
those reports, deciding whether child maltreatment has in fact
occurred, providing protective services if maltreatment is substan-
tiated, and maintaining records of child abuse and neglect reports and
case dispositions. This section briefty describes these critical elements
of the typical CPS system.
1. Reports of Child Maltreatment
Every state has statutes that require certain persons to report
suspected child maltreatment to the state or local CPS agency. 8 The
state statutes vary as to who must report and what must be alleged
before the agency will accept the report for investigation.
Reporting statutes typically define the group of citizens from
whom reports will be accepted and specify whether those individuals
are required or permitted to report.49 Most states have statutes that
contain both mandatory and permissive components; that is, they
require certain professionals-such as pediatricians, teachers, and
others who have frequent contact with children-to report, and they
permit, but do not require, any other individual who suspects a child
is abused or neglected to make a report50 In some* states, the
mandatory reporting duty is extended to all citizens."' The reporter
48. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-704 & 5-705 (1991); N.Y. SOC. SERv.
LAW § 413 (McKinney 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-543 (Supp. 1994); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 6311 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-510 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993); VA. CODE
ANN. § 63.1-248.3 (Michie Supp. 1994); see also Meriwether, supra note 35, at 143-49
(describing the components and basic structure of state child abuse reporting statutes).
49. Meriwether, supra note 35, at 145-46.
50. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERv. LAW §§ 413 & 414 (McKinney 1992) (requiring medical
professionals, coroners, school officials, social services workers, day care workers, mental
health professionals, and law enforcement officials to report, and permitting all others to
report); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6311 & 6312 (1991) (requiring medical professionals,
school administrators, teachers, social services workers, day care workers, foster care
workers, mental health professionals, and law enforcement officers to report, and
permitting all others to report); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-510 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993)
(requiring medical professionals, law enforcement officers, and teachers to report, and
permitting all others to report); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-2483 & 63.1-248.4 (Michie Supp.
1994) (requiring medical professionals, social workers, probation officers, school
employees, teachers, mental health professionals, law enforcement officers and child day
care employees to report, and permitting all others to report).
51. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-704 & 5-705 (1991); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-543 (Supp. 1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-510 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993). These
statutes sometimes exempt persons in certain privileged relationships from the reporting
requirements. However, many traditionally recognized privileges, such as the husband-wife
and physician-patient privileges, are expressly abrogated. See, eg., MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
1995] 2071
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is never required to have proof that abuse has occurred; usually, a
report must be made if the reporter has "reason to believe" or
"reasonable grounds to suspect" that child maltreatment may have
occurred 2 Telephone reports are accepted in all states; some states
also require that an oral report be followed by a written report within
a specified period 3 Many states will accept anonymous reports,
provided that the reporter alleges facts that constitute a statutorily
sufficient reason to initiate an investigation.'
Child protective services agencies are not required to accept all
reports of child maltreatment for investigation." Only those reports
containing allegations of behaviors or injuries that meet the state's
statutory definitions of child abuse or neglect need be investigated. 6
State definitions of child maltreatment vary greatly. Most states have
separate statutory definitions for physical abuse, sexual abuse, and ne-
glect.57 Many states also have a separate definition for emotional
LAW § 5-705(a) (1991) (abrogating all privileges except attorney-client and clergy-
parishioner); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-551 (Supp. 1994) (abrogating all privileges except
attorney-client); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-550 (Law. Co-op. 1984) (abrogating all privileges
except attorney-client and priest-penitent).
52. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-704 & 5-705 (1991); N.Y. Soc. SERv.
LAW §§ 413 & 414 (McKinney 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-543 (Supp. 1994); 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6311 & 6312 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-510 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.3 (Michie Supp. 1994).
53. See, eg., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-704(b) (1991) (requiring certain
reporters-health practitioners, police officers, educators and human services workers-to
follow oral reports with written reports); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 415 (McKinney 1992)
(mandating that reporters follow oral reports with written reports).
54. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-543 (Supp. 1994) ("Refusal of the person making
the report to give a name shall not preclude the Department's investigation."). State
statutes rarely sanction acceptance of anonymous reports expressly, but as a matter of
practice most CPS agencies will accept a statutorily sufficient anonymous report. Cf.
Besharov, Overreporting, supra note 42, at 270 tbl. 16.3 (recommending that anonymous
reports "not be rejected automatically, but ... be evaluated carefully").
55. Besharov, Overreporting, supra note 42, at 268-69.
56. See id. For example, if the state's definition of child abuse requires that the child
have sustained a serious physical injury, the reporter must specify the serious physical
injury he believes the child has sustained-a mere accusation that the Joneses abuse their
children is insufficient.
57. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-701(b) & (p) (Supp. 1994); N.Y. Soc.
SERv. LAW § 412 (McKinney 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(1) & (21) (Supp. 1994).
A few states have a single statutory definition for "abused or neglected child." See,
e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-490(B) & (C) (Law. Co-op. 1984 & Supp. 1993) (defining an
"abused or neglected child" as a child who is harmed by the "acts or omissions" of his
parent or guardian); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.2(A) (Michie 1991) (defining an "abused
or neglected child" as a child who is subjected to physical or mental injury, neglect of her
health, abandonment or sexual abuse; or whose parents are unable to care for her because
of incompetence or incarceration). Pennsylvania defines both battery and physical neglect
as "child abuse." 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6303 (1991).
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abuse.5
Some statutory definitions of physical abuse require that the child
have suffered specified types of injuries, 9 while others state that
abuse may be indicated by the presence of any serious, non-accidental
physical injury.' Most definitions of physical abuse require evidence
of actual physical harm to the child,6 but others proscribe particular
actions or behaviors toward children that create a substantial risk of
physical harm or are inherently cruel, regardless of whether those
actions result in actual physical harm.6' Statutory definitions of
sexual abuse almost always prohibit sexual acts with children without
respect to whether physical harm occurs as the result of the acts. 3
Statutory definitions of child neglect typically are written in general
terms and focus on acts or omissions of the parent that place the child
at risk, whether or not actual harm occurs.6 Definitions of emotion-
58. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(1)(d) (Supp. 1994).
59. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-490(C) & (F) (Law. Co-op. 1984 & Supp. 1993)
(defining "harm" to a child as, inter alia, the infliction of physical injury, and defining
"physical injury" as "death, disfigurement, or impairment of any bodily organ").
60. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-701(b) (1991); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW
§ 412 (McKinney 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(1) (Supp. 1994); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 6303 (1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.2(A)(1) (Michie 1991).
61. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-701(b)(1) (Supp. 1994); N.Y. Soc. SERV.
LAW § 412 (McKinney 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-490(C) & (F) (Law. Co-op. 1984 &
Supp. 1993).
62. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(1)(b) & (bl) (Supp. 1994) (including in the
definition of abuse: "creat[ing] or allow[ing] to be created a substantial risk of serious
physical injury... by other than accidental means," and "us[ing] or allow[ing] to be used
... cruel or grossly inappropriate procedures or cruel or grossly inappropriate devices to
modify behavior"); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.2(A)(1) (Michie 1991) (including the
creation of "a substantial risk of death, disfigurement, or impairment of bodily or mental
functions" in the definition of "abused or neglected child").
63. See, eg., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-701(b)(2) (Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-517(1)(c) (Supp. 1994); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6303 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. §
20-7-490(C)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.2(A)(4) (Michie 1991).
These statutes often include the creation of child pornography in the list of acts
constituting sexual abuse. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(1)(c) (Supp. 1994); 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6303 (1991).
64. See, eg., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-701(p) (Supp. 1994) (defining "neglect"
as "the leaving of a child unattended or other failure to give proper care or attention to
a child"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(21) (Supp. 1994) (defining "neglected juvenile" as
"[a] juvenile who does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline... ; or who has
been abandoned... [or] is not provided necessary medical.., or remedial care; or who
lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile's welfare"); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-
248.2(A)(2) (Michie 1991) (prohibiting parents from "neglect[ing] or refus[ing] to provide
care necessary for [the child's] health").
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al maltreatment usually require evidence of both inappropriate actions
by the child's parent or caretaker and actual harm to the child.65
The identity of the person who allegedly harmed the child is
critical to determining whether the CPS agency will accept a report of
child abuse or neglect.' There is a very strong presumption that
parents are responsible for protecting their own children, and that
government should not intervene in this relationship until it becomes
clear that the parents themselves are the source of danger to the
child.67 Thus, CPS agencies usually are not supposed to investigate
child maltreatment allegations unless the child's parent, guardian, or
caretaker is named as the person responsible for the maltreatment. 3
Abuse that is committed by someone outside of the family, such as a
neighbor or stranger, is a crime; thus it is considered more appropri-
65. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-701(b)(1) & 5-701(o) (Supp. 1994);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(l)(d) (Supp. 1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-490(B) & (G)
(Law. Co-op. 1984 & Supp. 1993). For example, the North Carolina statute defines an
emotionally abused juvenile as "[a]ny juvenile less than 18 years of age whose parent,
guardian, custodian, or caretaker ... creates or allows to be created serious emotional
damage to the juvenile. Serious emotional damage is evidenced by a juvenile's severe
anxiety, depression, withdrawal or aggressive behavior toward himself or others ...
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(1)(d) (Supp. 1994).
66. Most states distinguish between criminal child abuse and civil child abuse. E.g.,
compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(1) (Supp. 1994) (defining "abused juvenile" for the
purpose of determining the district court's civil jurisdiction over a case of child abuse or
neglect) with N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-318.2 & 14-318.4 (1993 & Supp. 1994) (defining the
crimes of misdemeanor and felony child abuse, respectively). Child protective services
agencies have the authority to intervene only in cases of civil child abuse. See, e.g., N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-544 (Supp. 1994).
67. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982).
68. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-701(b)(1) & 5-701(p) (Supp. 1994);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(5) (Supp. 1994); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6303 (1991); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-7-490(B) & (E) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-
248.2(A) (Michie 1991). A "caretaker" need not be a family member or full-time guardian
of the child, but he must be in a position of having some responsibility for the child's well-
being. For example, in North Carolina, a caretaker is defined as
[a]ny person other than a parent, guardian, or custodian who has responsibility
for the health and welfare of a juvenile in a residential setting. A person
responsible for a juvenile's health and welfare means a stepparent, foster parent,
an adult member of the juvenile's household, an adult relative entrusted with the
juvenile's care, or any person such as a house parent or cottage parent who has
primary responsibility for supervising a juvenile's health and welfare in a
residential child care facility or residential educational facility. "Caretaker" also
means any person who has the responsibility for care of a juvenile in a child day
care home or child day care facility ....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(5) (Supp. 1994).
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ate for law enforcement agencies, rather than CPS agencies, to inves-
tigate.69
An individual reporting child maltreatment must provide facts
that, if true, could support a finding that the child was abused or
neglected according to the state's statutory definitions; if required by
statute, the reporter also must allege that the person responsible for
the harm to the child was the child's parent, guardian, or caretaker.
If a report meets all of these criteria, then in every state the CPS
agency must accept the report for investigation.70
2. Child Maltreatment Investigations
Once a CPS agency has accepted a report of child abuse or
neglect, it must move quickly to determine whether the child in fact
suffered maltreatment. The agency does this by conducting a child
maltreatment investigation. The nature of the required investigation
may vary, and the details of how an investigation is to be conducted
are rarely spelled out in the child protection statutes.7' Typically,
the state will require the CPS investigator to interview both the child
herself and the child's parent or caretaker, to visit the child's home,
and, when appropriate, to obtain additional information from
"collateral" sources, such as the child's physician.72
State statutes usually require the agency to initiate an inves-
tigation within a specified period of time after the report is accepted.
Typically, the agency must commence the investigation within a few
days.73 In some states, the statutes also specify the time period in
69. Thus, some states have statutes or regulations directing CPS agencies to refer
reports of stranger abuse to law enforcement agencies. See, e.g., N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit.
10, r. 411.0304(c) (Jan. 1995). The CPS agency may nonetheless become involved in a case
of child maltreatment by a stranger or non-caretaker if it appears that the child's parent
or caretaker was neglectful in failing to protect the child from harm. Cf. In re Gwaltney,
68 N.C. App. 686, 690, 315 S.E.2d 750, 753 (1984) (upholding an adjudication of neglect
against a mother who failed to protect her children from sexual assaults by their non-
custodial father).
70. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-706 (1991); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §
424.6 (McKinney 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-544 (Supp. 1994); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 6362 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-650(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
71. But see MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-706 (Supp. 1994) (describing the scope
of the investigation and the actions to be taken by the investigator).
72. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-544 (Supp. 1994) (authorizing the CPS agency to
"consult with any public or private agencies or individuals" in the course of the
investigation); N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r. 411.0305(g) & (h) (Jan. 1995) (directing
investigators to interview collateral sources when appropriate).
73. Many states require the agency to initiate the investigation within 24 hours. See,
e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 424.6; 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6368(a) (1991); S.C. CODE
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which the investigation must be completed. Typically, this period
does not exceed sixty days.74
3. Decision-Making: Was the Child Maltreated?
After completing the investigation, the CPS agency must
determine whether to substantiate the child maltreatment report. To
make this decision, the CPS investigator-individually, in conjunction
with a supervisor, or as a member of a professional team-decides
whether the findings of the investigation support a conclusion that the
child has been maltreated, according to the state's statutory definition
of abuse or neglect.75 The standard of proof used by the agency in
reaching this decision may be quite low. Often, a finding of any
"credible evidence" supporting the allegations is sufficient to support
the conclusion that the child was maltreated.76 If the requisite
evidence is found, the report of child maltreatment will be labeled
"substantiated" or "indicated."77 If the report is substantiated, the
ANN. § 20-7-650(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993). Virginia requires the local child protective
services agency to "[m]ake immediate investigation" upon receipt of a report. VA. CODE
ANN. § 63.1-248.6(E) (Michie Supp. 1994). Some states require a more rapid investigation
if the report alleges physical or sexual abuse, rather than neglect. See, e.g., MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-706(b) (Supp. 1994) (requiring agency to initiate abuse investigations
within 24 hours and neglect investigations within five days); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-544
(Supp. 1994) (requiring the child protective services agency to initiate abuse investigations
within 24 hours and neglect investigations within 72 hours).
74. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-706(g) (1991) (requiring agency to
complete investigation within 10 days after receipt of report "to the extent possible," and
no later than 60 days after receipt of the report in any case); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 424.7
(McKinney 1992) (requiring agency to make a determination of "indicated" or
"unfounded" within 60 days of receipt of the report); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6368(c)
(1991) (requiring the agency to complete the investigation within 30 days); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-7-650(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993) (requiring agency to make a determination
of whether the report is "indicated" or "unfounded" within 60 days).
75. See generally Chris M. Mouzakitis, Intake-Investigative Assessment, in SOCIAL
WORK TREATMENT WITH ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN (Chris M. Mouzakitis &
Roju Varghese eds., 1985) 199-200 (describing the decision-making process); Barton D.
Schmitt & Susan L. Scheurer, Guidelines for Team Decision and Case Management, in THE
NEW CHILD PROTECTION TEAM HANDBOOK 321 (Donald C. Bross et al. eds., 1988)
(describing and providing guidelines for the decision-making process in multidisciplinary
child protection teams).
76. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-701(k) (Supp. 1994) (allowing the agency
to designate a report "indicated" upon a finding of "credible evidence, which has not been
satisfactorily refuted"); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAw § 412.12 (McKinney 1992) (defining
"indicated report" as a report supported by "some credible evidence").
77. "Substantiated" and "indicated" are the terms most commonly used to describe
the agency's determination that sufficient evidence was found to support the conclusion
that the child was maltreated. Reports that are not "substantiated" or "indicated" usually
are said to be "unsubstantiated" or "unfounded." For statutory definitions of "indicated,"
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agency must then determine what further actions should be taken to
protect the child.
4. Child Protective Services
Once a report of child maltreatment has been substantiated, state
CPS agencies have the statutory authority to intervene in the family
for the purpose of protecting the child.78 The range of activities that
can constitute child protective services is quite wide. In the most
severe cases of maltreatment, CPS agencies may remove children
from their homes-either temporarily or permanently-if that is the
only way to ensure their safety.79 At the other end of the spectrum,
the case may be closed immediately after the decision to substantiate
the report is made.0 This means that the agency chooses not to
see MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-701(k) (Supp. 1994) (" 'Indicated' means a finding
that there is credible evidence, which has not been satisfactorily refuted, that abuse,
neglect, or sexual abuse did occur."); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 412.12 (McKinney 1992)
("An 'indicated report' means a report made pursuant to this title if an investigation
determines that some credible evidence of the alleged abuse or maltreatment exists."); 23
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6303 (1991) (defining "indicated report" as "a report made
pursuant to this chapter if an investigation by the child protective service determines that
substantial evidence of the alleged abuse exists"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-490(M) (Law.
Co-op. 1984) (" 'Indicated report' means a report of child abuse or neglect supported by
facts which warrant a finding that abuse or neglect is more likely than not to have oc-
curred."). North Carolina uses the term "substantiated," see N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10,
r. 411.0306(b) (Jan. 1995), but does not define this term in either the statutes or the
regulations.
78. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-710 (1991); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §
424.10 (McKinney 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-544 (1993); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
6370 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-650(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. §
63.1-248.6(E) (Michie Supp. 1994).
79. The federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
272, 94 Stat. 500 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), requires that
reasonable efforts be made to retain children in the home. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1988).
As a practical matter, many states must contend with overburdened foster care systems,
see James P. Gleeson & Lynn C. Craig, Kinship Care in Child Welfare: An Analysis of
States' Policies, 16 CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 7, 8 (1994) (citing NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON FAMILY FOSTER CARE, A BLUEPRINT FOR FOSTERING INFANTS,
CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN THE 1990S (1991)), and this can work against removing children
from their homes in all but the most severe circumstances. Cf David Fanshel, Foster Care
as a Two-Tiered System, 14 CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 49, 50 ("[T]he current
period finds the foster care system under siege as social problems generate more cases
coming to child protective services agencies in which removal of children from their homes
cannot be avoided.").
80. McCurdy & Daro, supra note 40, at 84. For example, a 1988 review of child abuse
cases in New York found that 56% of "indicated" cases were closed the same day that
they were determined to be "indicated." Id. (citing B. Salovitz & D. Keys, Is Child
Protective Services Still a Service?, 5 PROTECrING CHILDREN 17 (1988)).
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provide any child protective services at all, despite its determination
that the maltreatment report should be substantiated.
Between these two extremes lies a continuum of services81 that
can range from low-key monitoring of a family for a short period of
time, to agreements between parents and CPS workers to make the
home environment safer for the child,' to intensive and very
intrusive measures such as family preservation services-the short-
term provision of extremely intensive counseling and other services
to a family when there is an imminent risk that a child will be
removed from the home. 3 Whenever possible, CPS agencies enter
voluntary agreements with families to cooperate in a child protection
plan.' If a family refuses to cooperate, the agency may go to court
to obtain an adjudication of abuse or neglect and a court order
directing the family to participate in the agency's child protection
planY3
II. THE CHILD MALTREATMENT CENTRAL REGISTRY
The CPS agency's duty to accept and investigate child abuse and
neglect reports necessarily involves a great deal of documentation and
record-keeping. Thus, every state has developed some type of
procedure for maintaining records of the reports it receives, the
81. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-647 (Supp. 1994) (describing the range of
dispositional alternatives for children determined to be abused or neglected).
82. Such voluntary agreements usually would address issues of parental behavior, such
as the need to provide better care and supervision if the problem is neglect, or alternative
means of discipline if the problem is abuse. See, e.g., N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r.
411.0306(d) (Jan. 1995).
83. See generally PETER J. PECORA Er AL., THE CHILD WELFARE CHALLENGE 269-
303 (1992) (describing family preservation services).
84. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERv. LAW § 424.10 (McKinney 1992) (stating that the CPS
agency may "offer" services to a family after "explain[ing] that it has no legal authority
to compel such family to receive said services"); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6370(a)
(1991) (substantially the same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-650(K) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993)
("After the initiation of protective services by the agency, if those receiving services
indicate a refusal to cooperate, the agency shall withdraw."); see also CHILD WELFARE
LEAGUE OF AMERICA, STANDARDS FOR ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION FOR ALL
CHILD WELFARE SERVICES 69 (1984) ("No plan can be imposed; the client and the worker
must each have a part in making certain choices and agreements.").
85. See, e-g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424.10 (McKinney 1992); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 6370(b) (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-650(K) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993). South
Carolina's statute expressly prohibits CPS workers from coercing a family's participation
in a "voluntary" plan by threatening to go to court. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-650(K) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1993).
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findings of its investigations, and the dispositions of the cases.86
Most states maintain some type of central listing, or registry, of the
findings of child maltreatment investigations. 7 This section explores
in detail the purposes and functioning of these central registries.
Child protective services agencies maintain registries of the
maltreatment reports that they receive for several reasons."8 First,
it is not uncommon for many separate incidents of maltreatment to
occur within the same family.8 9 If all of the incidents are recorded
on a single registry, a CPS worker can easily obtain information about
a family's history. This information can be helpful at several different
points in the investigation and treatment of child abuse. Upon receipt
86. McCurdy & Daro, supra note 40, at 81. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§
5-707 & 5-714 (1991 & Supp. 1994); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 422 (McKinney 1992 & Supp.
1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-552 (Supp. 1994); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6331 (1991);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-680 & 20-7-690 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. §
63.1-248.6(A) (Michie Supp. 1994).
87. As of this writing, 41 states and the District of Columbia have statutes authorizing
or requiring central registries of child maltreatment reports. See ALA. CODE § 26-14-8
(1992); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.040 (1990); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-546.03 (1994); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 12-12-505 (Michie Supp. 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11170 (West Supp.
1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-313 (Supp. 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 905(c) & (d)
(Supp. 1994); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2111 (1989 & Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
415.504(4)(a) (West Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-181 (1994); HAw. REV. STAT.
§ 350-2(c) (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 16-1623(c) (Supp. 1994); 325 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
5, para. 7.7 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-11-12.1(a) (Bums Supp. 1994);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.14 (West 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1520 (1993); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:403(H) (West 1986); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-714 (1991); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 51F (Law. Co-op. 1994); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.248(7) (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1994); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-257(3) (Supp. 1994); Mo. REV. STAT. §
210.145.2 (Supp. 1992); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-718 (1989); NEv. REV. STAT. § 432.100
(1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:35 (Supp. 1993); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.11 (West
Supp. 1994); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 422 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1995); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-552 (Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-05.5 (Supp. 1993); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.42.1(F)(1) (Anderson 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846(D) (West
Supp. 1995); OR. REv. STAT. § 418.765 (1991); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6331 (1991);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-72-7(a) (1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-680 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8A-10 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-408 (Supp.
1994); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.06 (West 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-408
(Supp. 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4916 (1991 & Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-
248.7(K) (Michie Supp. 1994); WYO. STAT. § 14-3-213 (1994).
88. See Jeanne Giovannoni, Substantiated and Unsubstantiated Reports of Child
Maltreatment, 11 CHILDREN & YOUTH SERvICES REv. 299, 299 (1989) (stating that the
three purposes of child maltreatment reporting laws are "to trigger investigatory action...
to establish a central registry in order to catch repeated offenders ... [and] to amass
statistical data on the incidence of child abuse").
89. See d.; cf. Richard M. Gargiulo, Child Abuse and Neglect: An Overview, in
CHILDREN AT RISK 1, 23-28 (Renitta L. Goldman & Richard M. Gargiulo eds., 1990)
(describing the characteristics of "abusive" parents).
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of an initial report, the worker can check the registry to determine
whether prior reports have been received about the particular child
or family.0 Knowing the family's history helps the worker assess the
level of risk associated with the report under investigation. Further-
more, when a child's maltreatment is substantiated and the CPS
program must determine the best disposition for the child, the family's
history can be taken into account.9
From the perspective of the CPS worker, this purpose is best
served if the registry includes both substantiated and unsubstantiated
reports. Even if a particular report was unsubstantiated, knowledge
that such a report was made still may contribute to the assessment of
risk to a particular child-a number of unsubstantiated reports may
indicate that a child is in fact in danger and that intervention is
warranted. 2 This is so because to be "substantiated" or "indicated"
a report must meet specific statutory and regulatory definitions and
requirements, not all of which are related to whether the child
actually was harmed.93 For example, if the state statute permits
intervention only when a child is harmed by a parent or "caretaker,"
reports of abuse by someone who is outside the scope of the
statute-such as a nonresident boyfriend or girlfriend of the child's
parent-may be deemed "unsubstantiated," even upon a finding that
the child was harmed.94 Furthermore, a finding of "unsubstantiated"
90. This helps to explain why a central registry is usually desirable. Typically, CPS
programs are administered by local agencies. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying
text. When records of child abuse or neglect are maintained only at the local level, a CPS
worker may have no way of knowing that a particular transient family has a long history
of child abuse.
91. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text (describing the range of possible
dispositions). Multiple substantiations of abuse or neglect may indicate that the home is
not safe for the child and that an extreme measure such as removal from the home is
therefore warranted.
92. See Hodge v. Jones, 31 F.3d 157, 166 (4th Cir.) (noting that "a series of 'unsubsta-
ntiated' or 'ruled out' entries for a given child may arouse suspicion of a pattern or
practice of emotional and physical harm to a child, warranting further inquiry by the
State"), cerL denied, 115 S. Ct. 581 (1994). But see Besharov, Overreporting, supra note
42, at 264 (suggesting that, in some cases, a number of unsubstantiated reports indicates
that the family is being reported for child abuse inappropriately). See also supra note 42
(describing the debate among authorities regarding the meaning of low substantiation
rates).
93. See supra notes 56-70 and accompanying text; see also Finkelhor, supra note 42,
at 286 n.1 (noting that the terms "unfounded" and "unsubstantiated" are terms of art in
the child protective services field that reflect whether statutory requirements have been
met; the terms "do not mean 'false' or 'scurrilous,' as they do in colloquial usage").
94. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (describing statutory definitions of
"caretaker"). See generally Giovannoni, supra note 88 (analyzing substantiated and
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may simply mean that the child's physical injuries were insufficient to
meet the state's definition of abuse, or that medical evidence of sexual
abuse was inconclusive.95
The second reason a CPS agency may wish to maintain a central
registry is to compile information about the extent and nature of child
abuse and neglect within the state.96 This information can then be
used by the agency in formulating CPS policies, and in making
decisions about the level of funding the agency needs and how it
should be allocated.97
Registries of child abuse and neglect reports typically include,
among other things, the name of the child believed to have been
abused or neglected, the name(s) of the person(s) suspected of
mistreating the child, and the case investigator's determination of
whether the report of child abuse was substantiated.9" The reports
of child maltreatment that are entered into the central registry may
be received directly from the individual reporters, or they may be
compiled by local CPS agencies and regularly submitted to the central
registry.9 Some states record all reports that are investigated by
unsubstantiated reports).
95. See Besharov, Overreporting, supra note 42, at 263. Although Professor Besharov
argues that low substantiation rates are an indication that child abuse is overreported in
the United States, he nonetheless acknowledges that
an unfounded report does not necessarily mean that the child was not actually
abused or neglected. Evidence of child maltreatment is hard to obtain and may
not be uncovered when agencies lack the time and resources to complete an
investigation or when inaccurate information is given to the investigator. Other
cases are labeled "unfounded" when no services are available to help the family.
And some cases must be closed because the child or family cannot be located.
A certain proportion of unfounded reports, therefore, is an inherent-and legiti-
mate-aspect of reporting suspected child maltreatment and is necessary to
ensure adequate child protection.
I On the other hand, an "unsubstantiated" report could mean that the agency has
completely ruled out the possibility of abuse. See Hodge, 31 F.3d at 160-61 (describing
how a report of child abuse based upon misdiagnosis of a broken arm was classified
"unsubstantiated" and "ruled out" after no evidence of abuse was discovered and the
cause of the problem was correctly diagnosed as osteomyelitis, an infection).
96. See Giovannoni, supra note 88, at 299; see also McCurdy & Daro, supra note 40,
at 81-82 (using central registry data to estimate the incidence of child maltreatment by
state).
97. Cf. McCurdy & Daro, supra note 40, at 89-90 (describing the chronic shortage in
funding many CPS agencies face, and noting that funding increases rarely keep pace with
increases in the rate of maltreatment reports).
98. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6336 (1991).
99. Some states receive all child maltreatment reports at a central telephone number,
and then refer the reports to local agencies for investigation. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV.
LAW § 415 (McKinney 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-640(A) (Law. Co-op. 1984). As a
matter of administrative convenience, these states are more likely to record reports directly
1995] 2081
2082 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
CPS agencies on their central registries, whether those reports are
subsequently substantiated or not;"° other states register only
substantiated reports."°'
In many states, information maintained on the registry is
available to other parties, including employers-particularly employers
in the child day care business, schools, or health care providers-or
agencies that certify foster parents or arrange adoptions.'1 Access
onto the central registry. Other states receive reports through their local child protective
services agencies, which make periodic reports of their work to the central agency. See,
e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-714(b) (1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-543 & 7A-
548(a2) (Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.6(A) & (E)(6) (Michie Supp. 1994).
100. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-650(E) & 20-7-680(B) (Law. Co.op. Supp. 1993);
VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.6(E)(7) (Michie Supp. 1994).
101. See, eg., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6336(a)(9) (1991).
102. Every state with a central registry allows CPS workers, courts, and law
enforcement personnel criminally investigating a particular incident of maltreatment to
obtain information from the registry. Fourteen states and the District of Columbia have
statutes that allow additional parties to obtain information from the registry. See ALA.
CODE § 26-14.8 (Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-506 (Michie Supp. 1993); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 11170 (West Supp. 1994); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2113 (1989 & Supp. 1993);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.51(4)(a) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995); 325 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5,
para. 11.1 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-11-12.1(f) (Burns Supp. 1994); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 235A.14 (West 1994); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 25.248(7) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1994); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.145.2 (Supp. 1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10a (West Supp.
1994); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 422.4 & 424-a (McKinney Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 37-1-408 (Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-248.7:2 & 63.1-248.8 (Michie Supp. 1994);
WYO. STAT. § 14-3-214 (1994).
Nine states permit the state CPS agency to decide whether other parties will be
allowed access to the registry. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 905(c) & (d) (Supp. 1994);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-1.4 (Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(H) (West 1986);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 51F (Law. Co-op. 1994); N.H. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:35 (Supp.
1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-552 (Supp. 1994); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.42.1(F)(1)
(Anderson 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8A-12 (1992); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN,
§ 34.06 (West 1986).
Sixteen states completely deny access to the registry by other parties. See ALASKA
STAT. § 47.17.040(b) (1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-546.07 (1994); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 19-3-313 (Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-185 (1994); IDAHO CODE § 16-1623(f)
(Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1507 (1993); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-714(c)
(1991); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-257(3) (Supp. 1994); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-719,28-722,
28-726, 28-727 (1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846(D) (West Supp. 1995); OR. REV.
STAT. § 418.765 (1991); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6334, 6335, 6340 (1991); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 42-72-8 (Supp. 1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-690 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-412 (Supp. 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4916(d) (1991 &
Supp. 1993).
The statutes of Nevada and North Dakota are ambiguous. Nevada forbids the release
of information "unless the right of the applicant to the information is confirmed and the
released information discloses the nature of the disposition of the case or its current
status." NEV. REV. STAT. § 432.120 (1985). North Dakota's statute allows the release of
information to "public officials and their authorized agents who require such information
in connection with the discharge of their official duties." N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-11
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to the registry may be permissive-that is, the party may check the
registry if it so chooses"-a-or mandatory-that is, the party must
check the registry before taking some action, such as extending an
employment offer or approving an adoption petition) °4
Because significant interests may be adversely affected by
inclusion on a child maltreatment registry, an individual may seek to
have his name expunged from the registry, particularly when the
maltreatment report is unsubstantiated. 5 Many central registries
are subject to statutory procedures for expunging reports 6 In
some states, expunction can occur only after the child maltreatment
investigation has been completed, and the report remains on the
registry during the interim."a 7 The initial request for expunction is
made to the agency that maintains the registry, and in the event that
it is denied, procedures for administrative hearings to review the
denial are available."° The grounds for expunction vary, but
typically the party seeking expunction must show some error in
decision-making that undermines the CPS agency's authority to
maintain the record in question."° After exhausting the ad-
(1989). Either of these statutes could be construed to permit the release of information
to public officials who have responsibilities such as approving licenses for day care centers
or adoptions.
103. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 424-a.l(d-1) (McKinney Supp. 1995) (permitting
law enforcement agencies to check the central registry before approving an application to
designate a residence a "safe home" for children).
104. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424-a.l(a) (McKinney Supp. 1995) (stating that
licensing agencies for adoptive homes, foster homes, and day care homes shall consult the
central registry); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.7:2(A) (Michie Supp. 1994) (requiring certain
employers to check the registry).
105. Not all registries include unsubstantiated reports, but many do. See supra notes
100-01 and accompanying text (describing the types of reports included on different states'
registries).
106. See; e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERv. LAW § 422.8 (McKinney 1992); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 6341 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-680(E), 20-7-655(G) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1993).
107. See, eg., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 422.8(a)(i) (McKinney 1992); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 20-7-650(E) & 20-7-680(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
108. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-715(c) (Supp. 1994); N.Y. Soc. SERV.
LAW § 422.8 (McKinney 1992); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6341 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-7-655(G) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
109. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 422.8(a)(i) (McKinney 1992) (requiring the
commissioner "to determine whether the record ... should be ... expunged on the
grounds that it is inaccurate or being maintained in a manner inconsistent with this title");
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6341(c) (1991) (granting an individual whose expunction
request has been refused the right to a hearing to determine whether the report should be
expunged because "it is inaccurate or ... is being maintained in a manner inconsistent
with this chapter").
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ministrative procedures, the individual may seek further review in the
courts.
110
When a person listed on a central registry contests the listing in
court, however, he is not likely to be seeking mere judicial review of
an administrative agency's decision. Usually he is seeking a judicial
declaration that the listing of his name on the central registry
deprived him of a constitutionally protected interest without due
process of law. The next part of this Comment describes how
procedural due process claims may be brought before the courts of
the United States, and summarizes the holdings of several recent due
process cases involving child maltreatment central registries.
III. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS:
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause guarantees
that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."'' The United States Supreme Court
has interpreted this clause to mean that states must provide constitu-
tionally sufficient procedures-"procedural due process"-before
taking an action that has the effect of terminating an interest in life,
liberty, or property that is subject to constitutional protection.lu
The Court has established a two-step method for analyzing procedural
due process issues: first, a court must determine whether the state has
intruded upon a constitutionally protected interest; second, the court
must determine whether the procedures attendant upon the intrusion
were constitutionally sufficient." This part of the Comment
identifies some of the liberty and property interests that have been
afforded constitutional protection by the courts of the United
States,"4 and describes how courts balance individual and state
interests to determine whether sufficient procedural protections have
110. See, eg., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-655(F) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
111. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
restrains the federal government in a like manner. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. See generally
2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE § 17.1 (1986) (describing the requirements imposed on governments by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
112. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972).
113. Id. at 570-71; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)
(establishing a three-part balancing test for determining whether procedures are
constitutionally sufficient); infra note 249 and accompanying text (describing the Mathews
test).
114. See infra notes 116-238 and accompanying text.
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been provided when state action impinges upon one* of these inter-
ests.115
A. Liberty and Property Interests Protected by the Due Process Clause
For over a century, the Supreme Court has sought to define the
boundaries of the "liberty" and "property" protected by the Due
Process Clause."6 The early understanding of the term "liberty"
was simply "freedom from personal restraint."1" In the late nine-
teenth century, however, the Supreme Court began to expand the
scope of personal interests that may properly be considered constitu-
tionally protected "liberty interests." In 1897, the Supreme Court's
decision in Allgeyer v. Louisiana... expressly rejected the notion that
the Constitution's use of the term "liberty" meant "only the right of
the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his per-
son."119 By 1923, the Court's definition of the term "liberty" had
broadened to include
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship
God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men."°
The scope of constitutionally protected interests in property has
likewise been expanded by the Court over the years. Today, the
understanding of constitutionally protected property interests goes
well beyond the traditional understanding of property as one's interest
in retaining those things of value that one owns.' An individual
may have property interests in government benefits," employ-
115. See infra notes 239-313 and accompanying text.
116. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV.
405, 405 (1977).
117. Id. at 411; see also 1 WMLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134 (defining
liberty as "the power of loco-motion... without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due
course of law").
118. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
119. Id. at 589.
120. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
121. See BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY 1216 (6th ed. 1990).
122. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 & n.8 (1970) (finding a property
interest in welfare benefits).
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ment,'2 or indeed any right, such as a contract right, that is protect-
ed by statutory or common law."
The range of liberty and property interests protected by the
Court's due process jurisprudence was at its broadest in the 1970s;11
in the years since, the range of personal interests deemed sufficient to
require constitutional protection has narrowed.1" Nevertheless,
many interests that are potentially implicated by the inclusion of an
individual's name on a child maltreatment central registry still may be
found to be protectible liberty or property interests."z  These
include liberty interests in family privacy and family integrity,",
liberty and property interests in employment, 29 and in some cases,
a liberty interest in reputation and freedom from stigma. 30
123. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,601 (1972) (finding a property interest
in government employment that was secured by an implied contract).
124. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,577 (1972) (stating that constitutional-
ly protected property interests "are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings" that derive not from the Constitution but from "an independent
source such as state law").
125. See id. at 570. The Roth court stated that, while "there can be no doubt that the
meaning of 'liberty' must be broad indeed," id. at 572, the reach of that concept is not
"infinite," id. at 570. See generally Monaghan, supra note 116, at 420-34 (describing how
the Court began to narrow the scope of constitutionally protected liberty interests in 1972).
126. For a thorough treatment of the history of the Court's interpretation of "liberty"
and "property" through the 1970s, see Monaghan, supra note 116, at 411-43.
127. This Comment focuses on the liberty and property interests of individuals whose
names appear on child maltreatment central registries as suspected abusers, but the author
does not intend to overlook the fact that children also have an important interest that may
be implicated by a state's policies regarding its central registry: a liberty interest in
freedom from harm. See Bohn v. County of Dakota, 772 F.2d 1433, 1438 (8th Cir. 1985)
(holding that parents' interests in familial autonomy and privacy are "counterbalanced by
the children's interest in continued freedom from abuse or neglect"), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1014 (1986); cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977) (holding that a child's liberty
interest in freedom from harm was at stake "at least where school authorities, acting under
color of state law, deliberately decided to punish a child for misconduct" by paddling him).
Often, however, the interests of children are assumed to be coincident with the interests
of their parents. See; e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,760 (1982) (stating that "until
the State proves parental unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in
preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship").
128. See infra notes 131-82 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 183-218 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 219-38 and accompanying text.
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1. Liberty Interest in the Family and
the Parent-Child Relationship"3
Early in the twentieth century, the United States Supreme Court
recognized that parents have a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in their relationships with their children. In 1923, the Court
stated in Meyer v. Nebraska' that the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause protects "the right of the individual... to marry,
establish a home and bring up children."'" Meyer involved a
Nebraska statute that prohibited teaching grade school children in any
language other than English.' In holding the statute un-
constitutional, the Court stated that parents' interest in "control[ling]
the education of their own" outweighed the state's interest in
socializing children to be American citizens by requiring that
instruction be only in English. 5 Two years after Meyer, in Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 6 the Court confirmed that the scope of par-
ents' rights protected by the Due Process Clause is large, and includes
the general right to control their children's upbringing. 7  The
Pierce Court declared that "[t]he child is not the mere creature of the
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations."''
131. This section gives particular attention to the parent-child relationship, as most
cases in the child maltreatment area that raise a claim of a liberty interest in the family
involve that relationship. Occasionally a claim will involve a foster family, or prospective
adoptive family. Claims of liberty interests in those relationships are discussed briefly. See
infra notes 173-82 and accompanying text.
Courts sometimes do recognize a liberty interest in relationships among extended
family members. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,164 (1944), the Supreme Court
acknowledged an interest similar to that of "parental right" in the relationship between a
child and the aunt who was her guardian. A plurality of the Court held that the right of
extended family members to live together was a protected liberty interest in Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,495-96 (1977) (plurality opinion). Should a claim relating
to extended family members arise in a case involving a child maltreatment central registry,
however, it seems unlikely that the Court would accord more protection to extended
family relationships than is typically accorded the parent-child relationship.
132. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
133. Id. at 399.
134. Id. at 397.
135. Id. at 401.
136. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
137. I& at 534-35.
138. Id. at 535. Like Meyer, Pierce was a case concerning the education of children.
At issue in Pierce was an Oregon statute that ordered parents to send their children to
public schools. Id- at 530-31. The plaintiff in Pierce, the Society of Sisters, was a
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Courts today readily accept that parents have a liberty interest in
the parent-child relationship that is accorded very strong
constitutional protection, and that encompasses the parents' right to
custody of their children 9 and control of their upbringing,"4 the
right to family integrity,'41 and the right to familial privacy. 4
This fundamental interest in the parent-child relationship is so
strong that it continues to exist, and presumptively prevails over state
interests, even when there is reason to suspect that a child is being
maltreated. 43 However, the liberty interest in the parent-child
relationship is not inviolable,'" as the child maltreatment cases
illustrate. When parents face allegations of child maltreatment, their
fundamental liberty interest "does not evaporate,"'45 but the
corporation that operated private schools--no parents were joined in the suit. Id. at 531-
32. Nonetheless, the Court apparently decided the issue upon the ground of parental
rights: "[W]e think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control." Id. at 534-35.
139. See Jordan by Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 343 (4th Cir. 1994) ("The bonds
between parent and child are, in a word, sacrosanct, and the relationship between parent
and child inviolable except for the most compelling reasons."); cf Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 653 (1972) (holding unconstitutional an Illinois statute that presumed an unwed
father was unfit to have custody of his children).
140. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390, 399.
141. See Hodge v. Jones, 31 F.3d 157, 163 (4th Cir.) (stating that "the sanctity of the
family unit is a fundamental precept firmly ensconced in the Constitution and shielded by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 581
(1994).
142. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (stating that there is a "private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter"); see also Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977) ("[IThe liberty interest in family privacy has its source,
and its contours are ordinarily to be sought, not in state law but in intrinsic human rights,
as they have been understood in 'this Nation's history and tradition.' ") (citation omitted).
143. Courts have therefore found that liberty interests in family privacy and autonomy
are implicated when allegations of abuse or neglect result in state intervention into a
family. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (holding that a liberty interest
in the parent-child relationship is implicated when the state seeks to terminate parental
rights on the ground of child neglect); Bohn v. County of Dakota, 772 F.2d 1433,1435 (8th
Cir. 1985) (stating that the "privacy and autonomy of familial relationships involved" when
child abuse is alleged and child protective services are provided "are unarguably among
the protectible interests which due process protects"), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986).
144. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 (stating that "the family itself is not beyond regulation
in the public interest"); see also Hodge, 31 F.3d at 163-64 (stating that "[t]he maxim of
familial privacy is neither absolute nor unqualified, and may be outweighed by a legitimate
governmental interest"). In Prince, the Court found that the state's interest in protecting
children from harm is strong enough to warrant intrusion upon the family's right to control
the child's upbringing, even when that intrusion implicates the free exercise of religion.
Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
145. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
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parents' interests may properly become the subject of state
intrusion.' Thus, courts have held that the state may intrude upon
this interest to investigate allegations of child abuse and neglect; 47
to provide child protective services where needed;' and even to
terminate parental rights upon the grounds of child abuse or neglect,
provided that the procedures accompanying these actions are
constitutionally adequate.49
It would seem to follow from the decisions recounted above that
a liberty interest in the parent-child relationship would at least be
implicated when a parent is listed on a child maltreatment central
registry, even if the state's interest in protecting children ultimately
were seen as stronger. However, the only federal court of appeals
that has addressed this issue' ° concluded that the* state's main-
tenance of a central registry does not affect the parent-child relation-
ship sufficiently to warrant the conclusion that a liberty interest is
implicated. In Hodge v. Jones,' the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit considered whether the listing of innocent parents on
the child maltreatment central registry implicated a protected liberty
interest in the family. The Hodges became involved with Maryland's
child protective services system in January 1989, when they took their
three-month-old son Joseph to the hospital because of an unusual
swelling in his right arm. The examining physician diagnosed a
146. See Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 8 (lst Cir. 1993) (stating that "the right to
family integrity clearly does not include a constitutional right to be free from child abuse
investigations" and citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972), which noted that the
state has a "right-indeed, duty-to protect minor children through a judicial deter-
mination of their interests in a neglect proceeding").
147. Id.
148. Bohn v. County of Dakota, 772 F.2d 1433,1436-37 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1014 (1986).
149. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753-54.
150. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue squarely in Hodge v.
Jones, 31 F.3d 157, 163-64 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 581 (1994). The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals has also considered a case involving a parent's claim that his Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights were violated by the maintenance of his name on a central
registry. Achterhof v. Selvaggio, 886 F.2d 826, 827-28 (6th Cir. 1989). In that case, the
trial court had dismissed the suit after determining that CPS workers were entitled to
absolute immunity for the "prosecutorial" action of listing individuals on the registry. Id.
at 828. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal on the ground that absolute immunity was
inappropriate. Id. at 831. The court thus did not reach the merits of Achterhof's
Fourteenth Amendment claim.
151. 31 F.3d 157 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 581 (1994). Retired Supreme Court
Justice Lewis Powell sat by special designation in Hodge, and concurred only in the
judgment. Id. at 160.
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fractured ulna." 2 Because the Hodges could not offer an "adequate
historical explanation" for how the bone was broken, 3 the
physician made a report of suspected child abuse to the Carroll
County, Maryland, department of social services (CCDSS), which
initiated a child maltreatment investigation the next day.Y A
CCDSS caseworker found no evidence of abuse, and filed a report
with the county that classified the case as both "unsubstantiated" and
"ruled out.' ' 55
Meanwhile, the Hodges were unsatisfied with the diagnosis
Joseph had received, and took him to two medical specialists.156
The specialists diagnosed osteomyelitis, a bacterial bone infection."7
Mrs. Hodge telephoned CCDSS and advised CPS workers that the
problem with Joseph's arm had been misdiagnosed. Several days
later, Mr. Hodge wrote a letter to CCDSS that reiterated the informa-
tion about the misdiagnosis and requested copies of the full report of
the investigation of the Hodges. 9 The assistant director of CCDSS
wrote back to the Hodges, advising them that the report of abuse had
been classified "ruled out" and "unsubstantiated," but because of a
statutory prohibition against the release of CPS records, the county
could not provide copies of the full investigation report to the
Hodges.16
The Hodges' names subsequently were entered into the Maryland
Department of Human Resources' Automated Master File (AMF), a
computerized database consisting of records of "every Maryland
citizen who has received any services, ranging from food stamps to
152. Id. at 160.
153. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 160-61. Maryland statutes defined "ruled out" as " 'a finding that abuse,
neglect, or sexual abuse did not occur.' " Id. at 161 n.1 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 5-701(s) (Supp. 1993)). "Unsubstantiated" is defined as a report in which" 'there
is an insufficient amount of evidence to support a finding of indicated or ruled out [abuse
or neglect].' " Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-701(u) (Supp. 1993)). Shortly
before the Hodge investigation, the Maryland Department of Human Resources, which
administers the CPS program, had adopted a new two-tiered classification system in which
reports are either "indicated" or "unsubstantiated." The new system replaced a four-tiered
classification in which reports were "confirmed," "indicated," "uncertain," or "ruled out."
However, the change had not yet taken effect when the Hodge investigation took place.
Id. The worker on the Hodge case apparently used both classifications, "ruled out" and
"unsubstantiated," to comply with both systems. I&.
156. Id. at 161.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 5 (1991)).
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child protective services," from a local department of social ser-
vices. 6' For the next fifteen months, the Hodges continued to
request copies of the full investigation report, and they embarked on
a campaign to have all records pertaining to their investigation
destroyed and the report on the AMF expunged. 62 CCDSS refused
to expunge the report, citing a Maryland statute that required the
department to maintain unsubstantiated reports for five years.'
Unable to obtain either disclosure of the child protective services
agency's records or expunction of the report, the Hodges brought suit
in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."6 They alleged that
CCDSS had violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due
process; specifically, they claimed that "maintenance of a record of
'unsubstantiated' and 'ruled out' child abuse violated their liberty
interest in familial privacy, and that failure to provide notice and a
hearing before maintaining that record violated their procedural due
process rights."'" The social services administrators and CPS
workers named in the suit offered the defense of qualified im-
munity'" The federal district court rejected this defense and
granted interlocutory summary judgment in favor of the Hodges on
the issue of liability. The court found that the defendants had
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-707(b) (1984 & Supp. 1987)). As of
1991, Maryland statutes permitted the expunction of "ruled out" reports within 120 days.
Id. at 161 n.3; see MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-707(b) (1991).
164. Hodge, 31 F.3d at 162. Section 1983 creates a federal cause of action when state
action deprives an individual of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
165. Hodge, 31 F.3d at 162.
166. Id. The defense of qualified immunity is
an accommodation by the courts to the conflicting concerns of, on one hand,
government officials seeking freedom from personal monetary liability and
harassing litigation and, on the other hand, injured persons seeking redress for
abuse of official power.... As such, whether an official protected by qualified
immunity may be held personally-liable for an allegedly unlawful official action
generally turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the action ... assessed
in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Employees of child protective
services may assert qualified immunity "in appropriate situations," including the situation
of listing an individual's name on a child maltreatment central registry. Id. Successful
assertion of qualified immunity in this situation would have entitled the defendants to
dismissal of the suit. Id. at 169 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).
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violated a protected interest in familial privacy that had been clearly
recognized by the courts.167
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding first that
familial privacy was not a clearly established right at the time of the
defendants' actions,'6 and second, that even if such a right were
clearly established, the inclusion of the Hodges on the AMF amount-
ed to a "pale shadow briefly cast over" the family 69 and constituted
" '[s]tate action that affects the parental relationship only incidentally
... [and] is not sufficient to establish a violation of a [sic] identified
liberty interest.' "170 According to the court, "[t]he Hodges' utter
failure to demonstrate that Defendants' actions were designed to
have, have had, or even will have, a significant impact on the parent-
child relationship or on their family's ability to function precludes the
establishment of a familial privacy infringement of constitutional
magnitude.' 7' Finally, the Hodge court stated decisively that it
would not extend "penumbral privacy rights" to define a new right to
freedom from confidentially maintained child abuse investigation
reports.'7
The liberty interest in the family that the Hodges sought to
invoke depended upon the existence of a parent-child relationship.
In a few cases, however, litigants have sought to establish that liberty
interests in other family relationships are implicated when an
individual is listed on a child maltreatment central registry. For
167. Id. at 162. The district court also found that the Automated Master File
constituted a "central registry" within the meaning of MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-715
(Supp. 1993), and that individuals listed therein were entitled to the procedural safeguards
provided in that statute. Hodge, 31 F.3d at 161 n.4. Because the defendants failed to
provide the procedural safeguards of § 5-715, the finding of liability was premised upon
that ground as well. Id. at 162.
168. Hodge, 31 F.3d at 167. "[G]overnment officials performing discretionary
functions[] generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
169. Hodge, 31 F.3d at 164.
170. Id. (quoting Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 8 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 226
(1991)) (alteration in original). According to Justice Powell, if there is a liberty interest
in familial privacy, it is not so clearly established that the defendants would have known
that their conduct "violate[d] the Hodges' clearly established federal statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. at 169 (Powell,
J., concurring in judgment). Thus, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from
civil damages, which was the issue on appeal. Id. (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).
According to Justice Powell, there was therefore no need to reach the constitutional issues,
and he "prefer[red] not to reach them." Id. (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).
171. Id. at 164.
172. Id. at 167.
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instance, in Wildauer v. Frederick County," a foster mother brought
suit against a Virginia county department of social services after a
child neglect investigation resulted in the removal of foster children
from her home and the placement of her name on the state's child
maltreatment central registry.' 4 Among other things, Wildauer
alleged that the county's actions deprived her of constitutionally
protected privacy interests. 5 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit made short work of this claim, noting that Wildauer, as a
foster parent, did not have actual legal custody of the children,' 6
nor did she have a legal relationship with them that was entitled to
the constitutional protection accorded the parent-child relation-
ship.1
7
In a recent Pennsylvania case, a litigant asked the state supreme
court to hold that a protectible liberty interest in family relationships
was implicated when the placement of his name on the state child
maltreatment central registry could result in his being denied the
opportunity to adopt children in the future.' R.'s name was listed
on the central registry after his daughter accused him of sexual abuse,
and a child maltreatment investigation determined that the report was
"indicated."' 9  Pennsylvania's central registry statute required
adoption agencies to ask the Department of Public Welfare whether
a prospective adoptive parent had, during the previous year, been the
subject of an "indicated" report of child abuse or neglect, before the
agency approved an adoption petition.Y Thus, R. argued, the
173. 993 F.2d 369 (4th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
174. I& at 371.
175. Id- at 373.
176. Id. When children are placed in a foster care arrangement, their parents retain
parental rights, while the CPS agency typically acquires legal custody. See Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 826-28 (1977). The foster parents' right to
the child is in the form of a contract right-that is, they have contracted with the CPS
agency to provide "substitute family care for a planned period for a child when his own
family cannot care for him." Id. at 823 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
177. Wildauer, 993 F.2d at 373. It is generally held that foster parents do not have a
protectible liberty interest in their relationships with their foster children. See eg., Kyees
v. County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 600 F2d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 1979) (per curiam);
Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1206
(5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978); see also Smith, 431 U.S. at 846-
47 (declining to reach the question of whether there is such a liberty interest, but noting
that "[w]hatever liberty interest might otherwise exist in the foster family as an institution,
that interest must be substantially attenuated" when natural parents' liberty interests in the
same children are at stake).
178. R v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 636 A.2d 142, 148 (Pa. 1994).
179. Id. at 144.
180. Id. at 148 & n.8; see 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6344(d) (1991).
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state's maintenance of his name on the central registry deprived him
of his constitutionally protected right to adopt a child.' The court
rejected this argument, stating that
R. does not explain, nor do we perceive how a statute that
operates in this way implicates an interest recognized under
Pennsylvania law... No liberty interest is implicated
because the legislature has not foreclosed the possibility that
a person named in an indicated report can seek to adopt a
child. No property interest is implicated because R. has no
legitimate claim of entitlement to adopt a child; it is no more
than an abstract desire on his part.12
2. Liberty and Property Interests in Employment
When the government takes an action that may deprive a citizen
of employment, a protectible liberty or property interest may be
implicated. Most of the cases regarding protectible interests in
employment involve government employees, because the most
straightforward way the government may become involved in
depriving an individual of employment is by refusing to hire him or
by discharging him from a government job."8' Government actions
may also affect an individual's private employment opportunities, and
this implicates the Due Process Clause as well.' 4
A protectible interest in employment may be in the nature of
either a liberty interest or a property interest. A liberty interest in
government employment is implicated if a state denies employment
to a person for improper reasons,ss or dismisses an employee based
181. R., 636 A.2d at 148.
182. Id (citations omitted). There was no indication in the facts of the case that R. was
actually seeking to adopt a child. See id. at 144, 148.
183. See, eg., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,566-67 (1972) (addressing refusal
by a public university to rehire a non-tenured faculty member); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 594-95 (1972) (same).
184. See, e.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232,238 (1957) (stating that
"[a] state cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other occupation
in a manner or for reasons that contravene the ... Fourteenth Amendment"); see also
Michael R. Phillips, Note, The Constitutionality of Employer-Accessible Child Abuse
Registries: Due Process Implications of Governmental Occupational Blacklisting, 92 MICH.
L. REv. 139, 150-64 (1993) (describing historic instances of governmental "blacklisting"
and their implications for private employment).
185. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573. The Roth court concluded, however, that no liberty interest
was implicated in that case. Id Roth was an assistant professor at Wisconsin State
University who was not rehired after he completed his one-year contract of employment.
Id at 566. Roth alleged that the university's refusal to rehire him was intended to punish
him for making critical comments about the university, and thus was an improper
infringement on his right to free speech. Id at 573-75. The Court apparently lent no
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on charges imposing "on him a stigma or other disability that
foreclose[s] his freedom to take advantage of other employment
opportunities."' 86 The Supreme Court has also held that a liberty
interest in employment prohibits a state, "in regulating eligibility for
a type of professional employment, [from] foreclos[ing] a range of
opportunities 'in a manner ... that contravene[s] ... Due
Process.' "'87
Constitutionally protected property interests "are created and
their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings" that
derive, not from the Constitution, but from "an independent source
such as state law";"= thus, an individual may have a property
interest in employment if he has a "legitimate claim of entitlement"
to the employment that exceeds "an abstract need or desire for
it."' Therefore, if a state law or state-granted contract establishes
the individual's right to employment, a property interest in that
employment is created."9
If a state's child maltreatment central registry is accessible by
employers, it may implicate liberty or property interests in either
public or private employment. An employer-accessible registry may
affect public employment opportunities because the government itself
may be the employer for certain positions that require a registry
credence to this argument. Id.
186. Id. at 573.
187. Id. at 574 (quoting Schware, 353 U.S. at 238).
188. Id. at 577. See generally 2 ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 111, § 17.5, at 235
(describing the significance of Roth in shaping the Court's approach to the identification
of constitutionally protected property interests).
189. Roth, 408 U.S. -at 577. The Court found a "legitimate claim of entitlement" in
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972), a case considered concurrently with Roth.
Like Roth, Sindermann was a non-tenured faculty member in a public university. Id at
594. Sindermann "became involved in public disagreements with the policies of the
college's Board of Regents," and subsequently was not rehired by the university. Id. at
594-95. Sindermann's situation differed from Roth's in that his job was subject to a
provision in the university's employment handbook that stated that a faculty member
should "feel that he has permanent tenure as long as his teaching services are satisfactory
and as long as he displays a cooperative attitude toward his co-workers." I& at 600
(internal quotation marks omitted). The Court distinguished Roth on this basis and stated
that "[a] person's interest in a benefit is a 'property' interest for due process purposes if
there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of
entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing." I& at 601 (citing Roth,
408 U.S. at 577). Finding that Sindermann "might be able to show from the circumstances
of this service-and from other relevant facts-that he has a legitimate claim of
entitlement to job tenure," U at 602, the Court held that Sindermann was entitled to
procedural due process protections, id. at 603.
190. See Perry, 408 U.S. at 601.
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check, such as public school teaching positions.'9' It may affect
private employment if private employers are either permitted or
required to check the registry before hiring for certain positions.'
Several courts have considered allegations that an interest in
employment was implicated by the placement of a person's name on
an employer-accessible child maltreatment central registry. The
outcomes in these cases have varied depending upon whether the
employment affected was current or prospective. In the cases where
only prospective employment was affected, the outcomes have
depended upon whether the individual's claim that listing on the
registry impaired her employment prospects appeared credible to the
court.
In Angrisani v. City of New York,"9 a federal district court
determined that a protectible liberty interest was implicated when an
individual's existing employment was terminated because he was listed
on the state's child maltreatment central registry. Angrisani had been
employed for seven years as the supervisor of a group home for
troubled boys, when a young resident of the home accused Angrisani
of striking him in the face. 4 Angrisani denied this allegation,
contending that the report was false and made solely to retaliate
against Angrisani for recommending that the youth be "referred out"
of the group home. 5 The local child protective services agency
determined that the report was "indicated," however, and listed
Angrisani on the state central registry.'96 Angrisani subsequently
succeeded in getting his record expunged from the registry, after his
accuser recanted and the New York Social Services Commission
determined that there was no credible evidence to sustain the finding
that the report was "indicated."'" However, the Commission did
not reach this decision until May 1985-almost a year after the initial
allegations of abuse were made. 8 By that time, Angrisani had lost
his job, and he alleged that he was terminated because his name
appeared on the central registry."9 He brought suit against several
parties, including the state of New York, claiming that he had been
191. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.51(2)(k) (1993 & Supp. 1995).
192. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 422.4 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
193. 639 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
194. Id at 1328-29.
195. Id
196. Id at 1330.
197. Id
198. Id
199. Id at 1334.
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deprived of a constitutionally protected interest in employment
without due process of law.
The district court sustained Angrisani's cause of action against
the defendants' motion to dismiss? °' The court held that no proper-
ty interest in employment was implicated because Angrisani was an
employee at will, and thus had no "legitimate claim of entitlement"
to his job.' The court did find, however, that a liberty interest in
employment was implicated, because the reason for Angrisani's
termination had been publicized to other employers.
In 1994, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined
that a liberty interest in prospective employment could be implicated
by the placement of an individual's name on New York's child
maltreatment central registry. In Valmonte v. Bane,' the subject
of a central registry report had worked with children in the past, and
claimed that she would return to this work were it not for her
inclusion on the registry. Valmonte was reported for child abuse
after she slapped her eleven-year-old daughter in the face as a
punishment for stealing.' The report was recorded on New York's
child maltreatment central registry, and an investigation revealed
that the allegations were true-Valmonte had indeed slapped her
daughter. The CPS agency determined that this was "excessive
corporal punishment" and classified the child abuse report as
"indicated."' Valmonte asked the agency to expunge her name
from the central registry.210 Her initial request for expunction was
200. Id. at 1332.
201. Id. at 1331.
202. Id. at 1332-33 (citing Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 151-52 (1974)).
203. Id. at 1333.
204. 18 F.3d 992 (2d Cir. 1994).
205. Itt at 999.
206. Id. at 997. The report was made by employees at the daughter's school. Id.
207. Id. New York's statute requires that all reports of child abuse or neglect be listed
on the central registry immediately upon their receipt, provided that "the allegations, if
true, would be legally sufficient to constitute child abuse or neglect." Id. at 995; see N.Y.
Soc. SERV. LAW § 422(2)(a) (McKinney 1992). The reports are later expunged if they are
determined to be unfounded. Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 995; see N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 422(5)
(McKinney Supp. 1995).
208. Vabnonte, 18 F.3d at 997. In her complaint, Valmonte stated that she slapped her
daughter because "other forms of discipline had not been successful." Id.
209. Id New York labels a report "indicated" upon the determination that there is
"some credible evidence" in support of the child maltreatment report. Id at 995
(emphasis omitted). Subsequent proceedings in New York Family Court seeking to order
the Valmonte family to cooperate in a child protection plan were dismissed "on the
condition that the Valmonte family receive counselling." Id. at 997.
210. Id
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denied, and she was again denied expunction after an administrative
hearing.2
11
Valmonte brought an action in federal district court under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the constitutionality of the central registry
statutory scheme.2 She claimed that she " 'wish[ed] to obtain jobs
in child care, education, and other fields involving children,' "but that
the listing of her name on the registry prevented her from doing
so.2" The CPS agency moved to dismiss the lawsuit.214 The dis-
trict court initially declined to dismiss Valmonte's due process
claims,2ts but then reversed itself sua sponte and dismissed
them.216
Valmonte appealed the dismissal to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals. The Second Circuit held that the dissemination of names of
persons on the central registry to employers and other parties, when
"coupled with the defamatory nature of inclusion on the list,"
implicated a protectible liberty interest in employment.217
Courts' willingness to afford protection to prospective
employment varies and tends to be fact-specific. Two recent decisions
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court demonstrate how a court may be
more inclined to recognize a protectible interest in prospective
employment when the individual seeking to establish the interest has
made a credible claim that she is seeking or will seek employment
from an employer with access to the registry.218
211. Id.
212. Valmonte v. Perales, 788 F. Supp. 745, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd sub nom.
Valmonte v. Bane, 812 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), rev'd, 18 F.3d 992 (2d Cir. 1994).
213. IM. at 751 (citation omitted).
214. d. at 747.
215. Id. at 755.
216. Valmonte v. Bane, 812 F. Supp. 423, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), rev'd, 18 F.3d 992 (2d
Cir. 1994). The district court reversed itself after realizing that there was no danger of
public dissemination of Valmonte's name as a child abuser. Id. at 425. In" the initial suit,
the court had not understood that access to the central registry was available only to
potential child care employers and a limited number of other persons authorized by statute
to obtain central registry information. IM. The court's misunderstanding regarding the risk
of public dissemination of the information had been dispositive in its conclusion that a
liberty interest was implicated, and absent that risk, it determined that Valmonte had no
liberty interest at stake and that the case must be dismissed. Id.
217. Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 994. To find a protectible interest in prospective employ-
ment, the court used a "stigma plus"-type analysis. The "stigma plus" analysis is explained
in more detail infra. See notes 223-27 and accompanying text.
218. In R. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 636 A.2d 142 (Pa. 1994), the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that no protectible liberty or property interest in
prospective employment was implicated when a father accused of sexually abusing his
daughter was listed on the central registry. Id. at 148. The court stated, "[Ihe Legislature
[Vol. 732098
CHILD ABUSE REGISTRIES
3. Liberty Interests in Reputation Plus a Deprivation:
The "Stigma Plus" Test
In 1971, the Supreme Court appeared to establish that the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause provides protection
against state actions that damage a citizen's reputation. In Wisconsin
v. Constantineau,19  the plaintiff claimed that a statute that per-
mitted police officers to post a notice declaring her to be an alcoholic
and forbidding the sale of alcoholic beverages to her was un-
constitutional.' The Court stated, "where the State attaches a
'badge of infamy' to the citizen, due process comes into play."'"
Thus, it concluded, "[w]here a person's good name, reputation, honor,
or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to
him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential."'
Later, the Court retreated from this position. In Paul v.
Davis, the Court stated that damage to reputation is not "by itself
sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process
Clause."'  The Paul Court interpreted the language in Constan-
has not barred R. from seeking employment or being hired to a position involving contact
with children," and that an interest in employment could not be demonstrated absent a
"legitimate claim of entitlement to [a] job." Id. (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 577 (1972)). R.'s claim to an interest in prospective employment was therefore
precluded. Id. Four months later, in A.Y. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 641
A.2d 1148 (Pa. 1994), the same court suggested that there might be a protectible interest
in prospective employment that is implicated by the child maltreatment central registry,
if the person listed on the registry would be precluded from obtaining employment in her
chosen field of work. The court stated that, when "the effect of placing appellant's name
on [the central] registry was to deny her employment in her field of study," id. at 1152 n.7,
procedural due process concerns were implicated, id. at 1152. The court's analysis skipped
over the first question in procedural due process claims: It did not expressly proclaim that
A.Y.'s protected liberty interest was found in her employment prospects. However, the
court emphasized that A.Y. had trained specifically to pursue a career in family crisis
counseling, and that her hope of having such a career would be undermined by her
placement on the registry. Id. at 1152 n.7. Thus, it appeared that the Pennsylvania court
was willing to find a protectible liberty interest in prospective employment, when the facts
indicated that an individual truly would be impaired in the pursuit of her chosen field by
the inclusion of her name on the registry.
219. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
220. Id. at 43435.
221. Id. at 437 (citing Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952)).
222. Id.
223. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
224. Id. at 701. However, states may recognize a liberty interest in reputation alone,
or in freedom from stigma, under state constitutions. See, e.g., R. v. Commonwealth, Dep't
of Pub. Welfare, 636 A.2d 142, 149 (Pa. 1994) (recognizing a liberty interest in reputation
under the Pennsylvania constitution).
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tineau--"because of what the government is doing to him"-to
"refer[] to the fact that the governmental action taken in that case
deprived the individual of a right previously held under state
law." Following this interpretation, federal courts of appeals have
concluded that Paul established a "stigma plus" test, which requires
that stigma or damage to reputation be accompanied by some other
cognizable interest in order to invoke the protections of the Due
Process Clause.' To reach the level of "stigma plus," the individual
must show that a state action creates a stigma, and that there is an
additional loss associated with the stigma m
In Bohn v. County of Dakota,' the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit relied on damage to reputation, coupled with "prote-
ctible family interests," to find that a liberty interest was implicated
when parents were subjected to a child abuse investigation. 9  "By
identifying the Bohns as child abusers, investigating the quality of
their family life, and maintaining data on them," the Bohn court
stated, "the [CPS agency] exposed them to public opprobrium and
may have damaged their standing in the community.""0 Interes-
tingly, the Eighth Circuit did not purport to apply the "stigma plus"
analysis in reaching this conclusion. Rather, it discussed the holdings
of Constantineau and Paul, and concluded that Paul was distin-
guishable and Constantineau was controlling?' The Bohn court's
225. Paul, 424 U.S. at 708 (citing Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433,437 (1971)).
226. Paul did not use the term "stigma plus," nor did it specify what the "plus" should
be; it just suggested that there must be a "plus." Id at 1000. The "stigma plus"
terminology was apparently first used by the Seventh Circuit in Colaizzi v. Walker, 542
F.2d 969 (1976). Interpreting Paul, that court stated that a "combination of stigma plus
failure to rehire/discharge states a claim even if the failure to rehire or discharge of itself
deprives the plaintiff of no property interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id at 973. In Neu v. Corcoran, 869 F.2d 662 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 816 (1989), the Second Circuit determined that defamation accompanied by "the
termination of government employment 'or deprivation of some other legal right or
status' "implicated a protectible liberty interest under Paul. Id. at 667; see also Valmonte
v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 999 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Paul for the proposition that loss of
reputation "must be coupled with some other tangible element in order to rise to the level
of a protectible liberty interest").
227. Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 999-1000.
228. 772 F.2d 1433 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986).
229. Id. at 1436 & n.4.
230. Id.
231. Id. The court stated that it was distinguishing Paul "[fin light of the protectible
family interests we have set forth." Id. Because the stigma of being labeled a child abuser
invoked these compelling interests, the court apparently found the fact pattern in Bohn
to be more comparable to Constantineau than to Paul, which involved only "a record of
petty crimes." Id.; see also infra note 232.
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conclusion that a liberty interest was implicated appeared to be based
more upon its finding that there were "protectible family interests"
involved, rather than upon its discussion of damage to reputation,
which was largely relegated to a footnote z2 Despite the court's
declaration that it was not following Paul, however, its analysis of
both factors certainly appeared to comport with the "stigma plus"
test.
Courts have applied the "stigma plus" test to find that a liberty
interest is implicated when a person is listed on a child maltreatment
central registry that is accessible by parties outside the CPS agen-
cy.' In Valmonte v. Bane, the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals found that the inclusion of Valmonte's name on a central
registry did indeed create a stigma: It "brand[ed] her as a child
abuser, which certainly calls into question her 'good name, reputation,
honor, or integrity.' "' Moreover, the Valmonte court found that
the stigma was not mitigated by the fact that disclosure of registry
information was statutorily limited to defined categories of potential
employers. 6  The "plus" that triggered the Due Process Clause's
protections in Valmonte was the fact that placement of Valmonte's
name on the child maltreatment central registry "place[d] a tangible
burden on her employment prospects.... [B]y operation of law, her
potential employers will be informed specifically about her inclusion
232. The court stated:
When the County Department found Bohn to be a child abuser, it drove a wedge
into this family and threatened its very foundation. The stigma Mr. Bohn suffers
as a reported child abuser undoubtedly has eroded the family's solidarity
internally and impaired the family's ability to function in the community. In light
of these clear adverse effects on familial integrity and stability, we find that Mr.
Bohn's reputation is a protectible interest. Because this stigma strikes so directly
at the vitality.of the family, we find the reputation interest at stake to be clearly
distinguishable from the respondent's record of petty crimes in Paul, which was
tied to no other protectible interest.
Bohn, 772 F.2d at 1436 & n.4. This reads very much like an application of the stigma plus
test, with protectible interests in family integrity and functioning providing the "plus."
233. It is unlikely that the "stigma plus" test could ever be invoked when the central
registry is not accessible to persons outside of the state CPS agency. The Supreme Court
has held that government assertions about an individual must be publicized in some way
before they can form the basis of a due process claim. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341,348
(1976).
234. 18 F.3d 992 (2d Cir. 1994). The facts of Valmonte are set forth supra; see notes
204-17 and accompanying text.
235. Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 1000 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573
(1972) (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971))).
236. Id.
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on the Central Register and will therefore choose not to hire
her." 7  The court concluded that the particular statutory scheme
in New York, which requires employers to state in writing their
reasons for hiring persons named on the central registry, "puts
burdens on employers" that result "in a change of that [listed]
individual's status significant enough to satisfy the 'plus' requirement
of the 'stigma plus' test.""8
B. How Much Process is Required?
The preceding discussion described how a state's maintenance of
a child maltreatment central registry may implicate liberty and
property interests that are protected by the Due Process Clause.
Once a court determines that a protectible interest has been implicat-
ed, the court will next inquire whether procedures provided to protect
the individual from an improper deprivation of the interest are
constitutionally sufficient. 9 The Supreme Court set forth the basic
test for determining the sufficiency of procedures under the Due
Process Clause in Mathews v. Eldridge.' Eldridge was disabled and
had received cash benefits from the Social Security Act's disability
benefits program for four years when the state agency responsible for
disbursing the benefits advised him that it had determined that he was
no longer disabled and that payments to him would therefore
cease.2' 1 Eldridge responded in writing, disputing the agency's
findings, but the agency reaffirmed its decision, and subsequently the
federal Social Security Administration accepted the state's deter-
uination and notified Eldridge that his benefits would be discontinued
at the end of July 1972.2 Eldridge brought suit in federal court,
challenging the constitutionality of the administrative procedures used
to determine that his period of disability had ended.243 He con-
237. Id at 1001. The Valmonte court went on to clarify that
the injury associated with the Central Register is not simply that it exists, or that
the list is available to potential employers. The deprivation stems from the fact
that employers must consult the list before hiring Valmonte, and if they choose
to hire her must state the reasons in writing to the state.
Id. at 1002.
238. Id at 1002.
239. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
240. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
241. Id at 324.
242. Id.
243. Id- at 324-25.
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tended that due process required that he receive a full evidentiary
hearing before the decision to terminate his benefits was made.2'
The Supreme Court first determined that Eldridge had a
protected property interest in the disability benefits.' Then, the
Court acknowledged that it "consistently has held that some form of
hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a
property interest,"2" and stated that "[t]he fundamental requirement
of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner.' "I The Court concluded, however,
that the "opportunity to be heard" does not always imply the
existence of a right to a full evidentiary hearing. Rather, "[a]ll that
is necessary is that the procedures be tailored, in light of the decision
to be made, to 'the capacities and circumstances of those who are to
be heard,' to insure that they are given a meaningful opportunity to
present their case."2' To determine in a particular case whether the
procedures provided were adequate to meet these requirements, the
court established a three-part test:
[O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the
specific dictates of due process generally requires con-
sideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest
that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of ad-
ditional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.2'
The Mathews formula is thus a balancing test that weighs the three
interests identified by the Court to determine just how much process
is due an individual faced with a particular deprivation.'
The Mathews test has been used to determine the sufficiency of
the procedures provided parents when they are the subjects of child
244. Id at 325. In making this argument, Eldridge relied upon Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 264 (1970), which established that a welfare recipient has a right to an
evidentiary hearing before benefits are terminated.
245. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332.
246. Id. at 333 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974)).
247. Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
248. Id. at 349 (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970)).
249. Id at 334-35.
250. In Mathews, the Court found that Eldridge had received sufficient procedural
protections, and that a pretermination evidentiary hearing was not required. It at 348-49.
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maltreatment investigations,.' child protective services interven-
tions,5 2 and proceedings to terminate parental rights. 53 In Bohn
v. County of Dakota,' the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
used the Mathews test to determine whether the rights of individuals
subjected to a child maltreatment investigation and intervention were
adequately protected. Bohn was investigated for child abuse after he
forcibly broke up a fight between his two sons, and one of the sons
sought help from a neighbor. 5  The department of social services
for Dakota County, Minnesota, subsequently investigated the Bohns,
and determined that there was "substantial evidence" of abuse. 56
The Bohns disputed this finding, but a child protective services
worker was assigned to the case nonetheless. The worker held a
series of meetings with the Bohns "in an attempt to remedy the
presumed problems stemming from the alleged child abuse" 57
The Bohns complained to the CPS agency and requested the
opportunity to make their side of the story part of the agency's
official record, but the agency refused to allow this. 8 The Bohns
then filed an action in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2" They
alleged that the department denied them due process by "failing to
provide them with notice of a finding of child abuse, statement of the
basis for that finding, and notice of their right to appeal."2"
Furthermore, they contended that the administrative procedures
provided by the department for contesting or appealing a finding of
child abuse were constitutionally deficient.2'
The court of appeals held that the Bohns had two distinct liberty
interests at stake in this case: an interest in "the privacy and
autonomy of familial relationships"' ' 2 and an interest in their
251. Bohn v. County of Dakota, 772 F.2d 1433,1438-39 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1014 (1986).
252. Id.
253. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982).
254. 772 F.2d 1433 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986).
255. 1d at 1434.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1434-35.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id at 1434.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1435.
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reputation." It proceeded to apply the Mathews test to determine
the sufficiency of the procedures provided to the Bohns'
Examining the Bohns' private interest first, the court concluded
that "Mr. and Mrs. Bohn's interest in their family's solidarity and
reputation as they relate to the family's vitality.., is counterbalanced
by the children's interest in freedom from abuse or neglect."' The
court determined that the CPS scheme at issue in the case "effectively
mediate[d] between the private interests." Next, the court
examined the risk of error in the CPS agency's procedures and
determined that, because "the County's investigation is intended to be
thorough and complex, drawing on the resources of health-related
professionals and a variety of county law enforcement and social
service personnel," the risk of error was acceptably low. 67 Further-
more, it determined that additional or substitute procedures would
not be more appropriate or less likely to produce error.' Finally,
it considered the government's interest, which it characterized as "a
strong interest in protecting powerless children who have not attained
their age of majority but may be subject to abuse or neglect. '269 It
concluded that "[t]o the extent that pre-investigation procedural
protections might delay or frustrate the protection of these children,
we believe the government's interest might be impaired."'27 Balan-
cing all of these factors, the court held that the Bohns' interest
received adequate protection from the procedures that were provid-
ed.271
In Santosky v. Kramer,2' the Supreme Court considered the
sufficiency of the procedures a state provided when it sought to
terminate parental rights on the ground of "permanent neglect."'273
A New York statute allowed state courts to terminate parental rights
upon a finding of permanent neglect that was supported by a "fair
preponderance of the evidence."'274 The Court stated decisively that
263. Id. at 1436 n.4; see also supra notes 228-32 and accompanying text (explaining how
the court reached this result).
264. Bohn, 772 F.2d at 1438-39.
265. Id. at 1438.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1439.
269. I&
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
273. Id. at 747.
274. Id.
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a strongly protected liberty interest was implicated when the state
sought to terminate parental rights, declaring that "freedom of
personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."'275 Furthermore,
the parents' interest "does not evaporate simply because they have
not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child
to the State." 6 The Court then applied the Mathews test 77 and
determined that, given the weight of the private interest at stake, New
York's procedures for terminating parental rights were constitutionally
insufficient. The specific flaw in the procedures that the Court
identified was the standard of proof: The state permitted termination
of parental rights upon a finding of neglect that was supported by
only a "fair preponderance of the evidence."' The Court stated:
"A standard of proof that by its very terms demands consideration of
the quantity, rather than the quality, of the evidence may misdirect
the factfinder in the marginal case.... Given the weight of the
private interests at stake, the social cost of even occasional error is
sizable."'279 The Court concluded that due process required that the
state meet the burden of producing "clear and convincing" evidence
before parental rights could be terminated.'
Recently, several courts have employed the Mathews test to
scrutinize the procedures used to decide whether to list an individual's
name on a child maltreatment central registry.' These courts have
found almost uniformly that the procedural safeguards afforded
persons listed on the registry were constitutionally insufficient.
Typically, the procedures are found to be deficient under the second
factor in the Mathews test: The risk of error in the procedures
provided is perceived to be too great.' TWo recent cases exemplify
the typical decisions that courts reach when child maltreatment central
registry procedures are constitutionally challenged.
275. Id at 753.
276. Id.
277. Id at 758-64.
278. Id. at 764. The Court rejected the state's argument that the procedures for
terminating parental rights should be evaluated as a "package," id. at 757 n.9, because
"[r]etrospective case-by-case review cannot preserve fundamental fairness when a class of
proceedings is governed by a constitutionally defective evidentiary standard," id. at 757.
279. Id at 764.
280. Id at 764-70.
281. See, e.g., Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992,1003-04 (2d Cir. 1994); A.Y. v. Common-
wealth, Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 641 A.2d 1148, 1151-52 (Pa. 1994).
282. See infra notes 287-96 and accompanying text; notes 308-13 and accompanying text.
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In Valmonte v. Bane,' the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit found that constitutionally protected liberty interests in
employment' and reputation were implicated when Valmonte
was listed on the child maltreatment central registry. Based on Val-
monte's admission that she had slapped her daughter in the face, the
child protective services agency determined that a report of child
abuse was "indicated.",1 6 The court applied the Mathews test and
concluded that New York's procedures for listing individuals on the
central registry created an unacceptably high risk of error. The
Court reached this conclusion even though New York's procedures for
maintaining names on the central registry and entertaining expunction
requests are quite elaborate."
283. 18 F.3d 992 (2d Cir. 1994).
284. Id. at 1003; see supra notes 212-17 and accompanying text.
285. Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 999-1002; see supra notes 234-38 and accompanying text.
286. Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 997.
287. Id. at 1003-04.
288. While names listed on the central registry are not available to the general public
and are generally kept confidential, there are statutory exceptions to confidentiality:
public agencies, law enforcement officers, judicial officers, and others may gain access to
the registry. Id. at 995. In addition, a New York statute requires "certain employers in
the child care field to determine whether potential employees are among those listed."
Id. (citing N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 424-a(1) (McKinney 1992)). When such a request is
made, the potential employer is told if the individual is the subject of an "indicated"
report. Id at 996. "The state department of social services will not inform the employer
of the nature of the indicated report, but only that the report exists." Id. If a potential
employee is on the list and an employer decides to hire him anyway, the employer must
keep " 'a written record, as part of the application file or employment record, of the
specific reasons why such person was determined to be appropriate' for working in the
child or health care field." Id. (quoting N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 424-a(2)(a) (McKinney
1992)).
According to the Valmonte court, when the local department of social services in New
York determines that a report is indicated, the statute requires the department to notify
the individual so labeled, and she has 90 days to request an expunction. Id. If she
requests the expunction, the state department of social services conducts a two-step review.
First, it reviews the facts to determine whether there is "some credible evidence" that the
subject of the report committed the acts in question. Id. (quoting N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW
§ 422(8)(a)(ii) (McKinney 1992)). If it finds credible evidence, it must next "ascertain
whether the acts alleged could be 'relevant and reasonably related' to the subject's
employment in any child care provider area." Id (quoting N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAw §
422(8)(a)(ii) (McKinney 1992)). There are three possible outcomes of this review: (1) if
there is no credible evidence that the subject of the report committed the acts, the record
is expunged; (2) if there is some credible evidence that the subject committed the acts, and
those acts are reasonably related to her employment in child care, the expunction request
is denied; and (3) if there is some credible evidence that the subject committed the acts,
but they are not reasonably related to employment in child care, the report is sealed; that
is, it is not expunged, but it may not be disclosed to potential child care employers and
licensing agencies. Id. (citing N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 422(8)(a)(iii)-(v) (McKinney 1992)).
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The court acknowledged that the state "has a strong interest in
protecting [children] from the infliction of physical harm by those
charged with their care."'  It determined, however, that the
procedures afforded Valmonte were constitutionally insufficient,
because of "the enormous risk of error that has been alleged by
Valmonte and acknowledged by the appellees."2  The court cited
the CPS agency's own data, which indicated that about seventy-five
percent of individuals who sought expunction from the central registry
ultimately were successful in their efforts.29' It found further that
"[m]uch of this unacceptably high risk of error must be attributable
to the standard of proof' used when the initial determination was
made to place an individual's name on the registry.2' All that the
"some credible evidence" standard demanded of the agency, the court
concluded, was that it "present the bare minimum of material credible
If the expunction request is denied after this process, the subject of the report may
have an administrative hearing before the state department of social services. Id. (citing
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 422(8)(a)(v) (McKinney 1992)). Again, the department of social
services must prove, by some credible evidence, that the alleged acts occurred, and it must
show that the allegations are reasonably related to employment in the child care field. Id.
(citing N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 422(8)(c)(i)-(ii) (McKinney 1992)). The same three
outcomes as above are possible. If the report still has not been expunged after this
hearing, the subject can challenge the agency's decision in court, which will determine the
propriety of the decision under an "arbitrary and capricious" standard. Id. at 996-97
(citing N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 422(8)(c)(i)-(ii) (McKinney 1992)).
There also is a provision for the subject of the report to receive a "post-deprivation
hearing." Id. at 997. This hearing is offered after the person is refused employment, or
is terminated from current employment, because she is named on the registry Id. If an
agency or employer decides not to hire or license an individual named in the registry, it
must give that individual a written statement indicating whether its decision was based in
whole or in part on the presence of an indicated report. Id. (citing N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW
§ 424-1(2)(b)(i) (McKinney 1992)). A similar statement is required if the person is fired
from her present job. Id. (citing N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 424-a(2)(b)(ii) (McKinney
1992)). If the reasons include the person's being named on the register, she is entitled to
the post-deprivation hearing. Id.; see N.Y. SOC. SERv. LAW § 424-a(2)(c) (McKinney
1992). The question to be determined at the post-deprivation hearing is " 'whether the
applicant.., has been shown by a fair preponderance of the evidence to have committed
the act or acts of child abuse or maltreatment giving rise to the indicated report.' "
Valnonte, 18 F.3d at 997 (quoting N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 424-a(2)(d) (McKinney 1992))
(emphasis added by court). If the agency fails to sustain this burden of proof, the report
need not be expunged, but it must be sealed from employers. Id. Finally, if the report is
not expunged by any of the administrative procedures that New York offers, it is expunged
by operation of law ten years after the youngest child named in the report turns eighteen.
Id. at 997 (citing N.Y. SOC. SERv. LAW § 422(6) (McKinney 1992)).
289. Vabnonte, 18 F.3d at 1003 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982)).
290. Id.
291. Id. at 1003-04.
292. Id. at 1004.
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evidence to support the allegations against the subject. ' 293  The
court preferred the "fair preponderance of the evidence" standard,
because it "allows for the balancing of evidence from both sides, and
gives the subject the opportunity to contest the evidence and
testimony presented by the local [department of social services]."'294
The court decided that the agency must use the "fair preponderance
of the evidence" standard before making its initial determination
whether to list an individual on the registry.295 It concluded:
We hold that the high risk of error produced by the
procedural protections established by New York is unaccep-
table. While the two interests at stake are fairly evenly
balanced, the risk of error tilts the balance heavily in
Valmonte's favor. The crux of the problem with the
procedures is that the "some credible evidence" standard
results in many individuals being placed on the list who do
not belong there.296
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in A.Y v. Commonwealth,
Department of Public Welfare,2' recently used the Mathews test to
determine whether procedures provided to an individual seeking
expunction from the child maltreatment central registry were
constitutionally sufficient. A.Y. had a college degree in psychology
and was planning a career in family crisis counseling,291 when she
was accused of sexual abuse by a three-year-old girl. A.Y. babysat
the child one night, and the next day, the child told her mother that
A.Y. had licked parts of her body, including her genitals and
buttocks.2' The child subsequently was examined and interviewed
at the Family Intervention Center of the local Children's Hospital."°
During the interviews, the child repeated the allegations against A.Y.,
and demonstrated them on an anatomically correct doll 10' The
local CPS agency interviewed A.Y., who denied the allegations."
The agency nevertheless determined that abuse was "indicated" and
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id-
296. Id
297. 641 A.2d 1148 (Pa. 1994).
298. Id- at 1152 n.7.
299. Id at 1149.
300. Id
301. Id
302. Id
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listed A.Y. on the state's central registry. A.Y's requests to have her
name expunged were denied. 3V
The evidence presented by the CPS agency at the expunction
hearing consisted of testimony by the child's mother about statements
made by the child, testimony by the caseworker, and testimony by the
hospital staff who interviewed the child. 4 There was no physical
evidence of sexual abuse °5 A.Y.'s evidence consisted of her own
testimony, the testimony of character witnesses, and the results of a
polygraph test?°6
Although the court did not state so expressly, apparently it found
that a liberty interest was implicated when A.Y.'s name was placed on
the registerw Therefore, the court proceeded to review the
procedures by which the agency denied A.Y.'s expunction request.
The court found that the use of hearsay evidence in the expunction
hearing rendered the procedures for expunction of reports
constitutionally insufficient.3" The court then set forth the re-
quirements mandated by due process when hearsay evidence is used
in an expunction hearing: (1) Hearsay testimony of a child victim
may be admitted in these hearings, provided the evidence has
sufficient indicia of reliability, and the hearsay may be testified to by
either the child's parents or professionals who examined the child;3
(2) when corroborated by admissible evidence, the hearsay and the
corroboration can "in toto constitute substantial evidence which will
satisfy the Agency's burden to justify a conclusion of abuse";310 and
(3) uncorroborated hearsay cannot satisfy the agency's burden unless
303. Id.
304. Id. at 1150. The court noted that testimony to hearsay statements is admissible
if the " 'time, content, and circumstances of th[e] statement provide sufficient indicia of
reliability.' " Id. at 1151 (quoting L.W.B. v. Sosnowski, 543 A.2d 1241,1246 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1988)).
305. It should be noted that the type of sexual abuse alleged would not be likely to
create physical evidence.
306. A.Y., 641 A.2d at 1150. The administrative hearing officer received, but did not
consider, the polygraph test, as it was not considered admissible evidence in Pennsylvania.
Id.
307. Pennsylvania's statute would have allowed potential future employers to learn of
the "indicated" sexual abuse. Id. at 1149-50 n.2. (The statute has since been repealed and
modified, id. at 1149 n.1; the present statute does not provide for accessibility by
employers. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6334, 6335, 6340 (1991)). There are no facts
reported in the case to suggest that A.Y. had in fact experienced a deprivation of
employment as a result of being named on the register, so the court apparently found a
protectible interest in her employment prospects. A.Y., 641 A.2d at 1152 & n.7.
308. A.Y, 641 A.2d at 1150-52.
309. Id. at 1153.
310. Id.
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several further requirements are met.3 1' These requirements are
that the statement must have been recorded accurately on audiotape
or videotape, that the taped record must disclose the identity of all
involved and must include the images or voices of all who were
present during the interview, and finally, that the child's statement
must not have been made in response to questioning "calculated to
lead the minor," nor can it have been "the product of improper
suggestion. ',31 Thus, the court found that A.Y. had not received all
the protections to which she was entitled, and it remanded the case
to the administrative hearing process for reconsideration of the
expunction request.3
IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
There is little, if any, clear guidance in the relevant caselaw
that would permit us to chart with certainty the amorphous
boundaries between the Scylla of familial privacy and the
Charybdis of legitimate governmental interests.314
The underlying assumption of procedural due process
jurisprudence, which is reflected in the Mathews test, is this:
Individuals and the government may both have legitimate interests in
the same thing-such as a piece of property, a relationship, or a
private liberty-and these competing interests may be irreconcilable.
When these interests have as their subject matter an issue as delicate
and compelling as the protection of children, the choice of one
interest over the other appears to be the choice between two evils
indeed. Should one risk the whirlpool of Charybdis, or set a course
toward Scylla, knowing full well that devastating loss could result
from either decision?
When a state chooses to place an individual's name on a child
maltreatment central registry, it is taking an action that potentially
could affect that individual's family life, his employment prospects, or
even his reputation in the community, if registry information becomes
known to the public.3 That same action, however, may further any
one of three interests that the state may have, including: (1) an
interest in maintaining data that could help it to identify children who
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. It
314. Hodge v. Jones, 31 F.3d 157, 164 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 581 (1994).
315. See supra notes 116-238 and accompanying text.
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are being abused or neglected over an extended period of time; 16
(2) an interest in maintaining data about child maltreatment in the
state generally, for the purposes of research, policy-making, or
funding decisions," 7 or (3) an interest in establishing a database of
individuals who, because of their history of maltreating children,
should not be provided opportunities-employment or otherwise-to
obtain unsupervised access to children"
Two general statements may help to summarize the cases
applying procedural due process principles to the state's maintenance
of a child maltreatment central registry. First, the courts have found
that due process issues are raised when the state maintains a central
registry that is accessible by parties outside of the child protective
services agency.3 19 Unless the information on the registry is thus
"published," the courts generally have failed even to reach the
Mathews test, because they have found that no constitutionally
protected interest is implicated.3s Second, when courts have
reached the Mathews test, the government's procedures usually are
found to be insufficient, because they do not adequately protect
against the erroneous placement of an accused person's name on the
list.3 21 The courts' identification of the sources of the risk of error
could have curious consequences for the child protective services
agencies involved in the litigation-as this Comment will discuss in
more detail below.
32
The government's interest in protecting children can justify the
entry of CPS workers into private homes to investigate allegations of
child maltreatment,323 and can even justify severing the parent-child
relationship when children's parents have become dangerous to them,
or have failed disastrously to provide for their care.3 4 In the child
316. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
319. Compare Hodge v. Jones, 31 F.3d 157, 164-67 (4th Cir.) (finding no protectible
interest implicated when the interest was in family relationships and the registry was not
accessible), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 581 (1994) with Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1002
(2d Cir. 1994) (holding that protectible interests were implicated by an employer-accessible
registry).
320. See, e.g., Hodge, 31 F.3d at 167; Wildauer v. Frederick County, 993 F.2d 369, 373
(4th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
321. See, eg., Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992,1003-04 (2d Cir. 1994); A.Y. v. Common-
wealth, Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 641 A.2d 1148,1150-52 (Pa. 1994); see also supra notes 283-
313 and accompanying text.
322. See infra notes 336-45 and accompanying text.
323. See Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1993).
324. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
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maltreatment central registry cases, courts have acknowledged that
the government's interest in protecting children can extend to
compiling information in a centralized database, 3' and even to
making that information available to appropriate parties outside the
CPS agency, when to do so may protect children in day care centers,
foster care, or other settings from coming into contact with known
child abusers."
However, when a central registry scheme is challenged, the
government's interest is usually outweighed by the liberty or property
interests of the individual listed on the registry-unless the only
private interest implicated by the child maltreatment central registry
is one in familial integrity or privacy, in which case the government's
interest has prevailed.3V This is true despite the fact that, among
the liberty and property interests discussed earlier in this Com-
ment, 28 the liberty interest in the parent-child relationship is the
one that ordinarily would be accorded the most substantial
weight.329  The most probable explanation for this seemingly
incongruous result is that courts in these cases are not focusing on the
government's narrow interest in maintaining a central registry for the
purpose of possibly precluding child abusers from future contact with
children through child care employment, adoption, and so forth;
rather, the courts are viewing the registry as one tool for achieving
the larger government interest of protecting children who are
presently suffering abuse or neglect in their own homes?' When
the whole of the government's interest in protecting children is placed
onto the Mathews scale, courts readily find that the government's
interest-and the government's authority to act on that interest-is
substantial and legitimate.331 Because the government's intrusion
325. See Hodge v. Jones, 31 F.3d 157, 166-67 (4th Cir.) (describing the uses that a CPS
agency may legitimately make of central registry information), cerL denied, 115 S. Ct. 581
(1994).
326. See R. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 636 A.2d 142, 151 (Pa. 1994).
327. See Hodge, 31 F.3d at 168.
328. See supra notes 116-238 and accompanying text.
329. The Supreme Court has stated that "the Constitution protects the sanctity of the
family... because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition." Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). "The rights to
conceive and raise one's children have been deemed 'essential,' ... 'basic civil rights of
man,' ... and '[r]ights far more precious than property rights.' " Bohn v. County of
Dakota, 772 F.2d 1433, 1435 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986) (citations
omitted).
330. See Hodge, 31 F.3d at 166.
331. Cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-71 (1944) (holding that the
government's interest in protecting children outweighs a legal guardian's interest in
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into the family is warranted in these situations anyway, the state's use
of the child maltreatment central registry as a tool is incidental, and
the listing of a parent's name where it will only be seen by child
protective services workers is no more than "a pale shadow briefly
cast" over the family.332 In this situation, even if the procedures
resulting in the placement of an individual's name on the registry
have a high risk of error, the costs of the error are not very sig-
nificant.
The balance comes out differently when the central registry
becomes more than just the tool of the CPS agency. When other
parties may obtain access to the registry and that access may result
either in the direct loss of a listed individual's employment, or a
stigma that puts employment or some other vital interest at risk, the
government may lose the case. There are two probable explanations
for this. First, perhaps the courts are focusing on a different aspect
of the government's interest in these cases.333 Logically, *the interest
that is relevant in these cases should be an interest in preventing
people who are known or suspected child abusers from being placed
in positions of unsupervised contact with children (on the assumption
that they are more likely than others in the general population to
harm any child they encounter), rather than an interest in protecting
an identified child from present abuse or neglect in her own home.
teaching children to disseminate religious materials on public streets); Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 767 (1982) (recognizing that government's interest in protecting children can
extend so far as to allow the state to terminate parental rights).
332. Hodge, 31 F.3d at 164. Bohn, 772 F.2d at 1433, also illustrates this idea:
Although ... Mr. and Mrs. Bohn's interest in their family's solidarity and
reputation as they relate to the family's vitality is a protectible interest, it is
counterbalanced by the children's interest in continued freedom from abuse or
neglect. Statutes like this one [authorizing intervention in the family when abuse
is substantiated] must attempt to harmonize this polarity of competing interests
.... Essentially, the state makes a finding (which is treated confidentially),
offers supportive social services, and monitors the progress of the family. Under
this statute taken alone, the finding is not published, the child is not ordinarily
taken from the parents, and the parents are not ordinarily prosecuted. Thus, the
statute is designed as a preventative measure to minimize the damage which
vulnerable children might suffer ....
Id. at 1438.
333. Unfortunately, the equivocation of "perhaps" is necessary here. The courts that
have found the government's interest outweighed in the Mathews balance have not
elaborated a great deal on the precise nature of the governmental interest that is being
weighed. Rather, courts have tended to restrict their consideration of the government's
interest to the simple recognition that the government has an interest in protecting
children from abuse or neglect. See, e.g., Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1003 (2d Cir.
1994).
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When thus viewed, the government's interest is present, but is more
tenuous.3" It simply is not strong enough to tip the balance
decisively when it is weighed against a private interest such as
employment.
The second probable explanation for the government's losses in
these cases is that it is far easier to make an error in attempting to
determine who is likely to harm a child in an occupational setting in
the future. Thus, the courts readily conclude that the risk that an
individual will be included on the list erroneously is too high in these
cases, and they seek to reduce the risk of error 3'
The source of the risk of error can be difficult to identify,
however. This difficulty is demonstrated by the applications of the
Mathews test in the two central registry cases discussed earlier in this
Comment, Valmonte and A. Y Those cases have a common character-
istic that is both subtle and startling: They prescribe remedies that do
not cure the problems raised by the facts of the cases. At the same
time, the remedies potentially impose substantial new burdens on the
CPS agencies, if the agencies want to continue to use their child
maltreatment central registries as tools to aid them in identifying and
responding to child abuse and neglect.
In Valmonte, the New York CPS agency learned that its rather
elaborate procedures were not enough in light of the low standard of
proof it used to substantiate reports. 336  The Second Circuit's
opinion appears only to require that a higher standard of proof be
used to determine whether the report is "indicated" before it may be
listed on the registry-not before determining whether the agency may
provide child protective services3 -but it nevertheless places a
significant burden on the agency to change its administrative
procedures. The facts of A.Y present a dilemma: The child's
allegations of sexual abuse are extremely serious and troubling,
338
334. Identifying individuals who are presently abusing children in their own homes is
a markedly different task than identifying individuals who might abuse children in an
occupational setting in the future.
335. See Valnonte, 18 F.3d at 992, 1003-04; A.Y. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Pub.
Welfare, 641 A.2d 1148, 1152-53 (Pa. 1994).
336. Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 1004; see also supra note 288 (describing New York's
procedures).
337. Read broadly, the Valnonte decision would amount to a sweeping, judicially
imposed reform of the entire child protective services system in New York. The CPS
agency would be prohibited from providing any services at all, even if there were credible
evidence of harm to the child, if that evidence failed to amount to proof by a fair
preponderance of the evidence that the reporter's allegations were true.
338. See A.Y., 641 A.2d at 1149.
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but difficult to prove-the evidence boils down to a swearing contest
between a three-year-old child and her babysitter.339 If A.Y.
committed the acts of which she was accused, then she probably is the
type of individual that policy-makers have in mind when they allow
central registries to be used as a screening device by child care
employers and others. If she did not commit the acts, then the
placement of her name on a list that likely will have the effect of
preventing her from obtaining employment in her chosen profession
amounts to an unjustifiable deprivation. The problem for the fact-
finder is that this is a case of directly contradictory testimony from the
only two people who were present when the acts did or did not occur,
and there is no way to be absolutely sure who is telling the truth.34
In each of these cases, the courts seemed to assume that the
interest in whose favor the Mathews balance tipped could be
protected only by sacrificing the other interest. The Valmonte court
sought to protect Valmonte's interests by requiring that, henceforth,
the state of New York meet a higher standard of proof before
entering a suspected abuser's name on its central registry.34' The
Second Circuit's focus on the standard of proof is somewhat curious,
though, given the facts of Valmonte's case. Whether Valmonte
slapped her daughter in the face was not a disputed issue of fact-she
admitted it. On remand, the agency should have little difficulty
sustaining its burden under the "fair preponderance of the evidence"
339. See id at 1150.
340. For many years, the common wisdom in the child protective services field has been
that when a very young child testifies to sexual acts, the testimony is likely to be true
simply because the child otherwise should not have the knowledge required to describe
sexual behaviors. See e.g., Gargiulo, supra note 89, at 23 ("When a child tells you that he
or she has been sexually assaulted in some fashion, believe theml Most children do not
have a frame of reference for the events described unless it actually occurred.").
Researchers have documented that sexually abused children "demonstrate atypical sexual
knowledge" and may exhibit sexually precocious behavior. Leo P. Cotter & Kathryn
Kuehnle, Sexual Abuse Within the Family, in CHILDREN AND FAMILIES: ABUSE AND
ENDANGERMENT 159 (Sandra Anderson Garcia & Robert Batey eds., 1991). Today, there
are many ways children may acquire this knowledge without having participated in sexual
activity-cable television brings depictions of sexual activity into American living rooms,
and even parents who scrupulously control exposure to such materials in their own homes
may find that friends, relatives, and babysitters are less cautious. It is also possible that
a child has inadvertently witnessed the sexual behavior of her parents or other adults, or
that she actually has been abused in the manner she describes, but by someone other than
the person she is accusing.
341. Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1004 (2d Cir. 1994).
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standard, and the result for Valmonte should be the same-denial of
her expunction request 2
The court's chosen relief in A.Y similarly failed to provide a
certain remedy to the aggrieved person. The Pennsylvania court's
changes to the hearsay rules to be used in central registry expunction
hearings 4" may be laudable for other reasons,344 but they do not
necessarily assure that A.Y. will not be listed erroneously-the
outcome will still depend upon who is more believable in the swearing
contest between the witnesses. Nor do they provide any assurance
that the accused's name will not be removed from the list erroneous-
Thus, the remedies prescribed by the courts in Valmonte and
A.Y seem to miss the mark in providing relief to the plaintiffs in
those cases. At the same time, they have a potentially far-reaching
effect for the CPS agencies: They may deprive the agencies of
information that would be quite useful to them in fulfilling their duty
to protect maltreated children.
There is an inherent conflict associated with the use of the child
maltreatment central registry as a device for screening individuals to
determine whether they should receive certain employment or be
permitted to adopt a child. The statutes establishing central registries
usually result in registries that appear to be designed to serve as tools
for CPS agencies, not as screening devices for employers and
others.3 4 A higher risk of error in procedures is tolerable when the
342. The court's decision to prescribe a remedy that fails to solve the plaintiff's problem
raises questions about the court's true concerns with the CPS procedures it scrutinized.
Perhaps the court's true concern was that New York's statute allowed a slap in the face
to be considered child abuse. If that is undesirable, however, it is a problem with the
state's definition of abuse, not with its standard of proof.
343. A.Y., 641 A.2d at 1152-53.
344. The court's requirement of audiotaped or videotaped interviews that account for
all persons present during the interviews certainly seems likely to provide better evidence
for courts to consider in determining whether hearsay testimony is reliable, and in
determining whether a child's allegations of sexual abuse were made without improper
leading or coercion by her interviewers.
345. If another child makes similar allegations against A.Y. in the future, that would
increase the degree of suspicion that A.Y. in fact abused children. This may be the only
way ever to identify and stop A.Y. if she is indeed a child molester.
346. Although a statute occasionally sets forth definite statements of the rights of
parties named on the registries, see, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-690(D) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1993), and many statutes provide for expunction procedures, see, e.g., 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6341 (1991), the procedures for compiling reports, retaining them, and
deciding whether and when to expunge them usually reflect the needs of the agency rather
than concern for the due process rights of persons named on the registry, see, e.g., N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-552 (Supp. 1994) (stating that the CPS agency shall maintain the registry
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very reason for having the list is to give CPS workers another tool to
do their jobs effectively than when the goal of the list is to identify
individuals for the very purpose of depriving them of an interest.
When courts hold central registry procedures to be constitutionally
insufficient, it is invariably because the registry is being used to
deprive an individual of a liberty or property interest, and therefore
the risk of error inherent in the procedures is simply unaccep-
table.347
This is an understandable result for the courts to reach-at the
root of due process jurisprudence is the recognition that the govern-
ment should be cautious before it deprives an individual of a liberty
or property interest.' However, the result poses a substantial cost
for the child protective services agencies-and it is a cost that perhaps
they need not bear.
When developing a child maltreatment central registry, state
policy-makers should bear in mind the purpose and duties of the CPS
agency, and design a registry that will meet that agency's needs above
all. Policy-makers may wish also to develop procedures for iden-
tifying individuals who, because of a history of abusing children,
should not be permitted to have unsupervised access to children
through their jobs or by serving as foster or adoptive parents.
However, policy-makers should recognize that this is a separate goal
that may not be completely compatible with the goals of the CPS
agency. A single registry system may not be able to meet these
disparate goals.
A state that chooses to have a system that is maintained expressly
to serve as one component of a comprehensive child protection
scheme, and that is only accessible by child protective services
workers and law enforcement officials, is unlikely to lose any
procedural due process challenges that are raised by individuals whom
it lists on the registry. Nevertheless, the state should take care to
ensure that it provides confidentiality safeguards, including sanctions
"in order to compile data for appropriate study of the extent of abuse and neglect within
the State and to identify repeated abuses of the same juvenile").
347. See, ag., Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992,1004 (2d Cir. 1994) (concluding that a low
standard of proof for substantiating abuse created an "unacceptably high risk" that an
individual would be listed on an employer-accessible central registry erroneously); A.Y.,
641 A2d at 1148 (concluding that the acceptance of uncorroborated and possibly
unreliable hearsay evidence in an expunction hearing created a risk that expunction would
be denied erroneously).
348. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
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for unauthorized releases of information. 3 9 The state may also wish
to recognize that personal-if not constitutional-interests in privacy
are implicated by the mere maintenance of the registry. Individuals
will naturally have strong feelings about being listed, particularly if
they believe that the listing is unwarranted.3  Because of the
benefits to the agency of retaining unsubstantiated reports of child
abuse or neglect on the central registry, this Comment does not
recommend that states adopt systems that require the expunction of
those reports. However, the state may wish to consider how it could
ameliorate the sense of insult to individuals who are listed on the
registry. For example, if agency resources permit, the state might
allow individuals listed on the registry to file written statements to be
maintained along with the registry records, just as credit bureaus
allow consumers to file statements about disputed claims.35'
Registries that are accessible by other parties ("accessible
registries") should be retained separately from the registry used by
the CPS agency. A system could be designed in which the agency's
registry served as the source for the information included in the
accessible registry, but was not itself accessible by other parties. Too
much is required of a single registry when it must serve both the
agency and potential employers, adoption agencies, and any others
who have access to it.
An accessible registry serves different purposes, and thus should
be organized differently from a non-accessible registry. It may be
necessary to define "child abuse" differently for the purposes of
placing an individual's name on the accessible registry than for the
purpose of initiating a CPS investigation.3 2 The standard of proof
349. See Hodge v. Jones, 31 F.3d 157, 165 (4th Cir.) (noting that Maryland's statutory
sanctions for breaches of confidentiality by CPS workers served to protect the reputations
of listed persons), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 581 (1994).
350. See id. at 161 (describing the Hodges' repeated efforts to have their names
expunged from the registry).
351. This is an approach that has already been adopted by at least one state. The
Wyoming central registry statute states: "Any person named as a perpetrator of child
abuse or neglect... in any report maintained in the central registry which is classified as
a substantiated report... shall have the right to have included in the report his statement
concerning the incident giving rise to the report." WYo. STAT. § 14-3-213 (1995). In one
of the cases discussed in this Comment, the subject of a child maltreatment investigation
requested the opportunity to make his side of the story part of the official CPS record.
Bohn v. County of Dakota, 772 F.2d 1433, 1435 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014
(1986). This suggests that parties named in these reports might feel their interests are
better served or protected when this is an option.
352. For example, it is possible to infer from Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992 (2d Cir.
1994), that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit does not consider slapping one's
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used to determine whether an individual to be listed on an accessible
registry has committed the abuse of which he is accused should be
higher than the standard that may be used for a non-accessible
registry5 3 Furthermore, an accessible registry absolutely must have
procedures for notifying individuals that they have been listed on the
registry, and for granting individuals the opportunity to request
expunction." When an expunction request is denied, the state
should offer administrative hearing procedures to review the request.
V. CONCLUSION
Child maltreatment central registries, as they currently exist and
operate, are subject to valid claims of procedural due process
violations if two conditions are met: (1) the information in those
registries is made available to others; and (2) the others with access
to the registries have the capacity to use the information to deprive
the listed persons of some protected interest. The cases that have
been decided on this subject reveal that courts generally are con-
cerned, therefore, with being certain that persons listed on registries
are not listed there erroneously.35 Unfortunately, the decisions do
not always reflect either a concern for or an understanding of CPS
agencies' need to maintain information for their own purposes, to
serve as a tool in meeting their statutory duties to protect children.
As a result, some of the solutions the courts have devised when facing
these cases create the risk that child protective services systems will
be deprived of information they need to function properly.3
56
Legislators may be called upon by their constituents both to
design policies that protect children in their homes and to respond to
public concern about child maltreatment in child day care and other
settings. To meet the first responsibility, they must design effective
CPS systems. To meet the second, they may wish to develop
mechanisms by which employers can screen out potential child
abusers. Legislators also must strive to be fiscally responsible and
own child in the face to be a sufficiently serious offense to warrant listing an individual on
an accessible registry.
353. See Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 1004.
354. See id. at 1002 (holding that listing on the central registry implicates a
constitutionally protected liberty interest); A.Y. v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Pub. Welfare,
641 A.2d 1148, 1152 (Pa. 1994) (concluding that the appellant was entitled to protection
against erroneous listing).
355. See Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 1004; A.Y., 641 A.2d at 1152.
356. Ironically, the solutions are not always clearly helpful to the persons who are listed
on the registries. See supra notes 336-45 and accompanying text.
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develop systems that are efficient. The temptation to use one system
to meet both of the above goals is therefore understandable.
However, it may not be possible to do this without sacrificing either
the needs of the CPS agency or the procedural due process rights of
persons listed on child maltreatment registries. Clearly, neither of
these results is appropriate.
States that maintain child maltreatment central registries may
decide, appropriately, to try to use registry information to screen out
known child abusers from certain types of employment. If this
decision is made, however, legislators should set two levels of
standards for the management of information regarding, individuals
who are reported to CPS agencies: one level for collecting and
safeguarding information that is to be used by the agency itself in its
efforts to protect children who have been identified because they have
been harmed already, and another level for collecting information for
the purpose of labeling certain individuals as child abusers and
controlling their access to children that they may harm in the future.
Problems arise when one registry tries to serve both functions. A
distinction should be drawn between records that CPS agencies may
maintain for their own purposes only, and those that they may release
to other parties.
Circe advised Odysseus that, when caught between the six-headed
monster, Scylla, and the whirlpool of Charybdis, one should "swiftly
turn your course toward Scylla's crag and speed the ship along, for
surely it is better to miss six comrades from your ship than all
together.""3 7 Undoubtedly this is good advice-unless, perhaps, it
is not really necessary to make the choice between the two evils.
JILL D. MOoRE
357. HOMER, supra note 1, at 183.
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